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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
QUIET RIVER, HEAVY WATERS: UN-SILENCING NARRATIVES OF SOCIALENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITIES IN THE CRADLE OF SOVIET PLUTONIUM
by
Rosibel Roman
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Gail Hollander, Major Professor
In December 1948, the Soviet Union’s first plutonium production facility, Mayak
Production Association (PO Mayak), began operation in the Southern Urals region of
Russia, at the western edges of Siberia, near the restricted city of Chelyabinsk-40, known
in the present day as Ozyorsk. Since then, rural communities located downstream from
PO Mayak have experienced health, economic, ecological and social impacts of
contamination from high-level radioactive wastes released by the facility into the Techa
River and its surrounding ecosystem. My research, drawing from archival research
conducted in Russia and the United States, as well as secondary sources in English and
Russian, focuses on the history of this contamination as a question of environmental
injustice.
Within the field of critical geography and the closely related interdisciplinary
body of scholarship broadly known as environmental justice, this study engages with
debates regarding the causal factors that contribute to the inequitable and unjust
distribution of environmental hazards along lines of social difference. Recognizing that
throughout this history, such social-environmental inequalities are conspicuously legible
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across space and lines of social difference within Soviet society, I frame this case of
environmental injustice within the context of French philosopher Henri Lefebvre’s
concept of the social production of space, and his deployment of this concept to question
the legitimacy of actually existing socialism in the Soviet Union.
Drawing from my analysis of archival materials and secondary sources, I argue
that the case of radioactive contamination in the Techa River contradicts the Soviet
state’s historical claims of social equality as its fundamental raison d’être. As the history
of the Techa River’s marginalized and sickened communities demonstrates, inequality
had been built into social relations in Russia in ways that persisted since the tsarist era,
through the Soviet years, and into the post-Soviet present. At the same time, this history
illustrates the necessarily globalized nature of the Atomic Age and the Cold War which
has entwined geopolitical actors in a relational co-production of (in)secure zones of
military-industrial technology and the marginalized communities living and dying in their
shadows.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
In 1948, the Soviet Union’s first plutonium production facility, Mayak Production
Association (PO Mayak), began operation near the restricted city of Chelyabinsk-40,
known as Ozyorsk in the present day. Since then, rural communities located downstream
from PO Mayak have continued to experience the health and economic impacts of
radioactive contamination released by the facility into the Techa River and the
surrounding landscapes.1 On the one hand, radioactive contamination originating from
PO Mayak reached the surrounding population indiscriminately, as a matter of proximity
to sources and pathways of exposure. On the other hand, certain segments of the
population, particularly in rural areas, suffered greater exposure than other areas as a
result of local authorities’ and PO Mayak directors’ deliberate policies.2 This research is
animated by the recognition of what distinguishes accidental and un-accidental exposure
in the case of PO Mayak. Taking these distinctions as my point of departure, my
dissertation utilizes archival sources to examine the role of Soviet-era social inequality as
a form of structural violence, shaping the environmental burdens of radioactive
contamination experienced by communities in the Southern Urals region, particularly

1

Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium
Disasters. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Galina Komarova, “Musliumovo Syndrome: To be
alive on the dead river,” Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology, 26(2): 315-354, 2001; Scott D.
Monroe, “Chelyabinsk: the evolution of disaster,” Post-Soviet Geography. 33(8) 533-545, 1992.
2

Paula Garb and Galina Komarova, “Victims of ‘Friendly Fire’ at Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Sites” in
Violent Environments. Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts (eds.). (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2001); Galina Komarova, “Ethnic and confessional aspects of the ‘Maiak’ accident” in Peoples, Identities,
and Regions: Spain, Russia, and the Challenges of the Multi-ethnic State (Moscow: Institute Ethnology and
Anthropology Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015); Michael Edelstein, Cultures of Contamination:
Legacies of Pollution in Russia and the U.S, Series: Research in Social Problems and Public Policy,
Volume 14, Michael R. Edelstein, Maria Tysiachniouk, Lyudmila V. Smirnova, eds. (Bingley, UK:
Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd., 2007).
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during the years from 1945 to 1977.3 I address primarily how exposure to radioactive
contamination, along with the suppression of knowledge about exposure and its lethal
risks, articulated with historical social inequalities and structural violence experienced by
communities situated in the areas of highest exposure to hazardous risk along the Techa
River in Chelaybinsk Oblast.

3

Brown, Plutopia; Garb and Komarova, Violent Environments; Edelstein et al., Cultures of Contamination.

2

Critical geography and environmental justice
Within the field of critical geography and the closely related interdisciplinary body of
scholarship broadly known as environmental justice, this study engages with debates
regarding the causal factors that contribute to the inequitable distribution of
environmental hazards along lines of social difference.4 A major point of contention
among scholars is the question of how social differences such as race and socioeconomic
status, along with capitalist market dynamics, compare in their respective causal powers
to produce inequalities in the spatial and social distribution of environmental goods and
hazards.5 In Soviet society, the official rhetoric opposing capitalism and social inequality
renders the social and environmental inequalities that did—and continue to—exist6 in the
north central region of Chelyabinsk Oblast a key case study in which to examine the
distinctly Soviet historical production of social and environmental inequalities in a
society to which a Revolution against capitalism, against inequality, gave birth. Yet,
while environmental justice as an interdisciplinary academic arena of social-

4

Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2000); Rachel Brahinsky et al., “Race, Space, and Nature: An Introduction and Critique,” Antipode
46.5 (2014) 1135-1152; Jake Kosek, Understories: The Political Life of Forests in Northern New Mexico
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice: Theories,
Movements, and Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
5

Bethany Cutts et al., “Media Frames and Shifting Places of Environmental (In)Justice: A Qualitative
Historical Geographic Information System Method” Environmental Justice, 9.1 (2016) 23-28; Liam
Downey, “US Metropolitan-area Variation in Environmental Inequality Outcomes.” Urban Studies 44:953977, 2007; Jeremy Pais et al., “Unequal trajectories: racial and class differences in residential exposure to
industrial hazard,” Social Forces, 92.3 (2014) 1189-1215.
6

Brown, Plutopia; Julian Agyeman and Yelena Ognyeva-Himmelberger, Environmental Justice and
Sustainability in the Former Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); Jane Dawson and Robert
Darst, “Russia’s proposal for a global nuclear waste repository: safe, secure, and environmentally just?”
Environment, 47.4 (2005) 12-21.

3

environmental research has become well-established in the United States along with
many other regions of the world,7 there still exists a relative scarcity of scholarly
literature concerning the question of social-environmental inequalities in relation to either
Soviet or post-Soviet societies.8

The social production of space
In relation to the spatial questions of critical geography and environmental justice, the
theoretical framework of my research centers on analyzing space itself as a product of
society, a concept adopted by critical geographers from the work of the late twentieth
century French theorist, Henri Lefebvre.9 A consideration of social difference and the
production of social space in the Techa River Valley requires taking into account the
historical contexts in which the social and cultural geography of the Southern Urals
formed during the twentieth century. While World War II itself ushered in deep and longlasting changes in this region, such changes cannot be adequately understood in isolation
from tsarist-era disruptions of the steppe and its non-Russian and non-Christian
populations. One of the premises of this study, based on the literature relating to the
social and cultural geography and history of this region, is that inequality and social
difference had been built into social relations in Russia in ways that persisted since its

7

David Harvey, Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers
Inc., 1996); Elizabeth Ammons and Modhumita Roy, Eds., Sharing the Earth: An International
Environmental Justice Reader (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 2015).
8

Julian Agyeman and Yelena Ognyeva-Himmelberger, Environmental Justice and Sustainability
in the Former Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
9

Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 1991).
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early days as a sovereign state, even as these social inequalities took different forms over
time. Whether these inequalities had become so normalized over time that they went
unnoticed even by the most earnest revolutionaries or whether they consciously chose to
preserve them, the fact remains, as I aim to demonstrate below, that the Revolution did
not succeed in the goal of fully undoing the old structures of inequality based on social
difference. In this way, it follows that the Soviet production of social space would also
maintain old inequalities.

History of Soviet Science
In examining the role of the regime of privileged knowledge, this study also engages with
the field of the history of science, focusing on Soviet science in relation to the
environment and nature. American and Western European scholars have critiqued Soviet
policies and practices towards ecosystems and resources, often portraying the Soviet
system as inherently antagonistic towards nature.10 In more recent years, American and
Western European scholars have posed challenges for this model of Soviet humanenvironment relationships. Their arguments are based on historical research
demonstrating critical yet previously overlooked nuances in the histories of Soviet-era
science and human-environment relationships.11 In this way, scholars argue that it is

10

Marshall Goldman, The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union, (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1972); Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., Ecocide in the USSR: Health and
Nature Under Siege (New York: Basic Books, 1991); Paul Josephson et al., An Environmental History of
Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
11

Jonathan Oldfield and Denis J.B. Shaw, “A Russian Geographical Tradition? The Contested Canon of
Russian and Soviet Geography, 1884-1953,” Journal of Historical Geography, 49 (2015) 75-84; Douglas
Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley:

5

inaccurate to portray Soviet scientists as monolithic and incapable of self-reflexive
critique or to essentialize Soviet human-environment relationships as invariably
deleterious.12 Based on such awareness of tensions and differences among Soviet
scientists, I utilize archival sources of key individual scientists’ personal documents and
official records to illuminate their role in producing knowledge—or, alternately
suppressing knowledge—about human health and environmental impacts of plutonium
production and how they enabled or challenged the processes by which environmental
inequalities were produced.

Reading Privileged Texts
The bulk of the data analyzed for this dissertation consists of archival material from
national and regional state affiliated repositories. Rather than regard archival material as
self-evident truth, I view the texts as qualitative data which exist by virtue of their
privileged position held at the particular place and time when these texts were produced.
Understanding that the privileged nature of state bureaucratic documents means that there
are narratives and texts missing from the repositories of these documents, my approach to
these primary sources has been to not only read them for the existing text, but also that
which is missing. At the same time, given that this study directly addresses the Soviet

University of California Press, 1999); Maria A. Rogacheva, The Private World of Soviet Scientists from
Stalin to Gorbachev, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
12

Denis J.B. Shaw and Jonathan Oldfield, “Scientific, Institutional and Personal Rivalries among Soviet
Geographers in the Late Stalin Era,” Europe-Asia Studies, 60.8 (2008) 1397-1418; Sonja D. Schmid,
Producing Power: The Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2015); Sergey Glebov, “The Empire of Language: Space and Structuralism in Russian Eurasianism,”
in Empire De/Centered: New Spatial Histories of Russia and the Soviet Union, Sanna Turoma and Maxim
Waldstein, eds. Pp: 31-60 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013).
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state and how it articulated and exercised power to impose distinct structures within
space and society, documents produced by Soviet state bureaucracies represent a critical
source of data. Within the holdings at OGAChO in particular, a key source of data
relating to individual scientists, is located within the division of personal documents for
individuals whose life work has been recognized as contributing to the region’s history.
Archival material housed at a site of state institutional privilege is processed and
mediated by archivists who are, first, bound by obligations primarily to the state and its
laws, particularly in terms of guarding classified or politically sensitive material,
secondly, to the professional practice and theory of producing and maintaining archival
material, especially as technology and sheer growth in the volume of material continues
to usher in rapid changes, and thirdly, to production of knowledge.13 Apart from archival
material, additional sources of data consist of published material as primary and
secondary sources. I place the texts I use as sources of data within the context of their
time and place with the intention of keeping their meanings and purposes intact, using
what I know about the Soviet state, the governing bodies and hierarchies of government
and the Communist Party. Accordingly, I use the historiographies relating to that Soviet
period in order frame my interpretation of the texts. In line with my critical approach to
the inherent subjectivity of knowledge production, I am conscious of my own value-laden

13

Francis X. Blouin and William G. Rosenberg, Processing the Past: Contesting Authority in History and
the Archives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Kristina Spohr Readman, “Memoranda,” in
Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from
19th and 20th Century History (New York: Routledge, 2009).

7

questions and analysis interpreting texts in a language, a history, and a place that is far
from my own.14

Archives
I have collected archival data at the Integrated State Archives of Chelyabinsk Oblast
(Ob’edinennyi Gosudarstvenniy Arkhiv Cheliabinskoi Oblasti, or OGAChO) in the city
of Chelyabinsk, Russia, where I conducted research for four months. This repository
houses archival materials and primary sources relevant to the social, cultural, political,
and geographical history of Chelyabinsk Oblast. I have also focused on the holdings
corresponding to the unpublished works and personal materials for specific Soviet
planners, local authorities, geographers and ethnographers who had been active during
the period preceding the construction of PO Mayak. Finally, I have closely analyzed
these sources with particular attention to how each individual interprets and represents
social difference and equality in relation to space. At the Central State Archives of
Scientific-Technical Documentation (TSGANTD) in St. Petersburg, a repository of
records pertaining to the study of radiation safety as a division of the Institute of
Experimental Medicine which are held in Fond R-128. In addressing Soviet scientists’
individual subjectivities and their social positions affected their practice of research as
well as how the knowledge they produced was applied towards the response to

14

Benjamin Ziemann and Miriam Dobson, “Introduction,” in Dobson and Ziemann (Eds.), Reading
Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from 19th and 20th Century History (New York: Routledge,
2009).

8

radioactive contamination,15 primary and secondary sources has been guided my search
for data to address this question shifts from official discourse to the personal.

Tankograd: a chronotope of total war
In light of the extent to which the aftermath of the World War II--in Russian history and
memory, the Great Patriotic War--permeates many aspects of this study, my approach to
the Soviet past from 1945 until the late Brezhnev years is situated within a particular
spatial and temporal consciousness. I borrow the term “chronotope” - or time-space from the Russian philosopher and semiotician, Mikhail Bakhtin, to narrate the spatial and
temporal impacts of the war as a chronotope of total war.16 I argue that such a narrative is
necessary in order to adequately appreciate the transformations of landscapes,
demography, daily living--the production of space--during and after the war. World War
II was experienced extremely and viscerally by most Soviet citizens in such a way that
cannot be overstated in an analysis of the production of social space during the postwar
years.17 In the case of the Southern Urals, the social and spatial transformations triggered
by the war occurred with especially dramatic effect, and they continued to define the
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region long after 1945.18 The close proximity of mineral resources throughout the Urals
and the relative remoteness of the region served as ideal characteristics to further
establish this region as a hub of scientific-technical research and military-industrial
manufacturing.
During the war, particularly from 1941 through 1943, urgently mobilized
evacuations transferred masses of people and machinery eastward, with the aim of
protecting key industrial resources and production capacity from Nazi encroachment.
Primarily the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan received evacuees
and accommodated transplanted factories. The receiving populations and landscapes
tended to be logistically overwhelmed by the sudden influx of evacuees and machinery.
For perspective, approximately 44 per cent of 1,523 evacuated factories were dismantled
and transferred by rail to be reconstructed in the Urals.19 Evacuations from western
regions of the Soviet Union fleeing Nazi encroachment involved seemingly endless and
often severely harsh journeys, creating the persistent sense of displacement and
interrupted life, often permanently.20 For populations of regions receiving evacuees such
as the Urals, the mass evacuations brought about striking changes in the demography and
landscapes. In Chelyabinsk Oblast’, for example, the sudden influx of factory workers

18

James R. Harris, The Great Urals: Regionalism and the Evolution of the Soviet System, (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1999).

19

Sanford R. Lieberman, “The Evacuation of Industry in the Soviet Union during World War II,” Soviet
Studies, 35(1) (Jan. 1983), p. 91; Robert Argenbright, “Space of Survival: The Soviet Evacuation of
Industry and Population in 1941,” in Beyond the Limits: The Concept of Space in Russian History and
Culture, ed. Jeremy Smith, Studia Historia 62.
20

Rebecca Manley, “The Perils of Displacement: The Soviet Evacuee between Refugee and Deportee,”
Contemporary European History 16(4) (2007), pp. 495-509.

10

and materialization of industrial spaces such as military machinery manufacturing centers
imposed so prominently on the landscape that its capital city, Chelyabinsk, acquired a
second name: “Tankograd.”21
Rural areas experienced the most dramatic transformations. Demographically, the
majority of adult males, with the exception of the elderly and sick, whether voluntarily or
not, were shipped westward to combat. On the one hand, this placed a heavier burden of
labor on rural women as farms lost approximately 75 percent of the workforce as a result
of males drafted to war.22 Facing a high demand of food supply for the Red Army, in
addition to the crowded workforce in urban areas, farms frequently fell short of
producing a sufficient surplus to provide for farm workers themselves. Because only
urban workers were eligible to receive food ration cards, rural populations often suffered
from severe and persistent hunger.23
In addition to the mass evacuations, the transport of Gulag prisoners and prisoners
of war, a third kind of massive displacement occurred, one which targeted Soviet citizens
with German heritage in the lower Volga region. Based on the suspicion of collusion with
the Nazi army, Stalin ordered these populations to be forcibly removed from their homes
and exiled eastward to forced labor camps in Siberia and Central Asia steppes. The routes

21

Lieberman, “The Evacuation of Industry.”

22

William Moskoff, The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Overy, Russia’s War.
23

Overy, Russia’s War, p. 224.

11

of exile, as in the case of the evacuations and the transport of Gulag prisoners, often
traversed the Southern Urals.24
The purpose of discussing such ways in which displacements, interrupted life, the
breakneck pace of militarization, and coercive labor articulated into what I am
conceptualizing as a chronotope of total war is to demonstrate the complexity of wartime
Soviet space and its production, the terrain of social difference, and temporality—in
short, the world of living and dying in the Soviet Union during total war. In this sense, I
distance my narrative from a common tendency among American and Western European
scholars of Russian environmental history to criticize the apparent zeal which
characterized Soviet militarization during and after World War II. Such critiques point to
the Soviet Union’s rampant environmental destruction as evidence of “ecocide.” The
ecocide narrative, however, elides the reality that had the Soviet Union failed to
militarize at a manic pace and scale, it would have fallen to the Nazi regime—a fate it
only very narrowly avoided.25 Considering this hypothetical scenario of a Nazi victory
over the Soviet Union, one might ask the hypothetical question: Stalin notwithstanding,
how much more environmentally ethical than the Soviets could one have expected the
invading Nazi army to be in fulfilling its conquest of Lebensraum?
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Turning towards the end of the war, the world saw the first use of nuclear
weaponry as one of the final acts, carried out by the United States on hundreds of
thousands of human beings, many of whom were civilians, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on
August 6th and 9th, 1945. Given the Soviet experience of the war, still raw and present in
memory, the almost accidental circumstances by which it dodged Nazi conquest, and
President Truman’s demonstration of coolly executed acts of massive annihilation on
these two dates, the rationale for fevered militarization emerges into sharper focus as a
stance of self-preservation, and less a matter of ecocide for its own sake. The chronotope
of total war gave way to a new chronotope - one in which the shell-shocked USSR faced
the new and greater threat of nuclear devastation and redefined itself in terms of security
above all else.
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CHAPTER II: THEORIZING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE
PRODUCTION OF SPACE
Introduction
Environmental justice (EJ) activists and scholars have long recognized the versatility and
universal potential of EJ as a field of scholarly research as well as a set of organizing
principles by which to mobilize social change.26 In academic scholarship, EJ articulates
with a broad spectrum of disciplines ranging from social science fields such as
geography, sociology, urban planning, and law, to biological sciences such as
epidemiology and toxicology, to the humanities such as history, literature, and film.27 The
ability for such diverse fields of study to engage with EJ attests to its broad applicability
and conceptualizing power to pursue salient questions and concerns across society.
Similarly, EJ has generated growing waves of social movements that animate EJ concepts
in specific, contingent situations of environmental injustice not only within the United
States but across the world.28 In this chapter, I will present an overview of EJ as a field of
research and as an organizing banner for social movements, while commenting on its role
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in the theoretical framework within which I situate the social-environmental inequalities
that shape the history and landscape of the Techa River Valley. Following this overview,
I will draw connections between EJ and Henri Lefebvre’s conceptualization of the
production of space, with attention to radioactive contamination in the Techa River
Valley. As I incorporate EJ and Lefebvre’s ideas within my theoretical approach to
social-environmental inequalities in the Techa River Valley, I also involve Marxist
critiques of capitalist transformations of social-environmental relationships. Finally, I
will discuss rifts between Marx-inspired approaches to knowledge production as
conceptualized by Anglophone and Western European theorists working within the frame
of Marxist critical theory in recent decades vis-à-vis historical Soviet implementations of
Marxist principles.

Overview of environmental justice (EJ)
The first part of this overview of EJ will begin with a short summary of the movement’s
origins, widely understood as having arisen as part of the Civil Rights Movement in
American history, followed by a brief survey of the fundamental premises of EJ research
and scholarship.29 Furthermore, this brief survey will include a short review of selected
literature concerning the definition of EJ, which is often conceptualized in terms of
distributive justice—specifically the unequal distribution of environmental burdens of
toxins placed upon communities composed of primarily racial/ethnic minorities and
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impoverished populations.30 As part of this short review of EJ literature, I will include
other conceptualizations of justice which extend beyond the quantitative measures of
environmental burdens as distributed among marginalized communities. These additional
conceptualizations of justice are oriented towards addressing the broader sociopolitical
processes that produce and reproduce that distribution. Lastly, I will elaborate the concept
of contested knowledges,31 another aspect of sociopolitical structures and processes of
justice which hold particular relevance for the history of victims of radiation exposure in
the Techa River Valley concerning the question of contested knowledges and the power
differential separating the knowledge claims of scientific authorities from those of
victimized communities.32

EJ origins and environmental racism
EJ, as it is known today, arose from the sociopolitical consciousness activated by the
Civil Rights Movement, confronting the historically, sociopolitically, and geographically
specific conditions that have resulted in systematic oppression of racial/ethnic minorities
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throughout the history of the United States.33 Tracing the history of the movement,
environmental sociologist Dorceta Taylor points out that the origins of EJ are anchored
deep in the history of grassroots activism working against sociospatial manifestations of
racial discrimination during the nineteenth century—an era in which the “environment”
as a concept had not yet been discursively or consciously linked to civil rights or justice
in American politics. 34 Yet, as she argues, the products of structural racism, including
substandard housing conditions for enslaved African American populations, deceptive
and predatory terms in sharecropping practices and land acquisition, and the
institutionalized racial segregation of the built environment as well as recreational
“natural” environments such as parks and beaches all fall within the scope of what would
be conceptualized as environmental racism in the late twentieth century.35 In this way,
such early activists mobilized against the physical and psychological health burdens
borne out of disproportionate exposure to environmental harm as a function of
sociospatial patterns of structural racism. Similarly, the pioneer of EJ research, Robert
Bullard, has referenced Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s active support of striking sanitation
workers in Memphis, Tennessee during the 1960s as another example of EJ activism
before it was known as such.36 Additionally, on the issue of sanitation and municipal
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waste services, EJ scholar, David Naguib Pellow, has followed the history of Chicago’s
municipal waste services into nineteenth century to illuminate social-environmental
inequalities experienced by marginalized African American communities overburdened
by exposure to toxins from landfills and municipal waste processing centers in the places
where they both live and work.37
These examples of the mobilization around environmental racism also allowed for
important disruptions of how the “environment” itself was understood. One of the early
key contributions to the EJ theoretical framework which manifested from coining the
term environmental racism is that it “transformed the environment into a salient frame in
communities of color.” 38 In this way, the concept of environmental racism began to pose
challenges for environmental discourse that tended to exclude minorities while focusing
on the environment as a predominantly non-human realm to which peopled places, such
as those of everyday life and livelihoods, were positioned as antagonists.39 Furthermore,
the EJ movement’s early 1980s coinage of the term, environmental racism, can be
understood as part of a larger quest for social change and justice, where the broader
sociopolitical and historical processes that have produced environmental injustice also
manifest as an insidiously life-threatening form of racism.40 As Bullard has defined
environmental racism, it “refers to any policy, practice, or directive that differentially
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affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or
communities based on race or color. Environmental racism is only one form of
environmental discrimination.” 41 On this point, EJ scholars emphasize that
environmental racism and environmental injustice are not interchangeable terms;
although environmental racism is a form of environmental injustice, it refers to a more
specific set of circumstances, as noted above.42 Relatedly, Bullard, along with EJ scholars
as a whole, argues for the importance of recognizing within the scope of EJ the
institutionalized and inequitable sociospatial relations which also result in the
victimization of low-income white populations.43

Understanding environmental justice
As Bullard’s research began to gain increasingly more currency in the 1990s, sometimes
with the effect of being inaccurately interpreted by other scholars, he published a
clarifying definition of the term environmental justice: “Environmental justice embraces
the principle that all people and communities are entitled to equal protection of
environmental and public health laws and regulations.” 44 Bullard’s 1996 definition
highlighted the quest for justice as part of the struggle against environmental racism, in
addition to emphasizing the inclusive scope of EJ as a social movement and field of
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research. Despite Bullard’s clarification, an oversimplified interpretation of EJ continued
to develop as it was frequently represented as focusing only on a distributive
understanding of justice.45 Such representations relied primarily on simplistic spatial
terms analyzing the location and distribution of environmental burdens, e.g. the proximity
of minority and low-income neighborhoods to sites that release concentrated toxins.46 As
social and environmental research studies began to increase in number, this limited
concept of EJ, focusing on the distribution of environmental “bads” continued to be
reproduced.47 Addressing such misrepresentations of EJ, Bullard has sought to set the
record straight, even publishing an open response to one such research paper which
inaccurately portrayed both the movement and research field of EJ.48 On the issue of the
thematic predominance of unequal shares of environmental burdens placed upon lowincome and racial/ethnic minority populations, along with Bullard’s call for “equal
protection,” it is worth remembering the urgency and alarm Bullard’s early research
findings rightfully provoked regarding environmental conditions that pose highly
dangerous physical and mental health risks, particularly for children, and sharply
diminish the quality of life in places where racial/ethnic minorities and low-income
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populations reside.49 Under these circumstances, there is justification in the prioritization
of focusing EJ’s attention to hazardous conditions rather than on the important yet less
life-threatening issues of access to environmental amenities or “goods.” As a result, the
sheer amount of Bullard’s findings and publications, substantiated with empirically-based
analyses, succeeding in placing into focus the patterned starkness of environmental
hazards concentrated at sites where marginalized populations, such as impoverished
communities and racial/ethnic minority groups live, work, or attend school. In this sense,
it becomes clear that the EJ movement’s message was that the broader, more profoundly
ingrained social structures and processes that have produced these environmentally
harmful conditions needed to change and improve. As political theorist David Schlosberg
noted, ever since Bullard’s earliest research endeavors on this topic, the social
movements with which his work has articulated have long aimed beyond the question of
distribution as the only measure of justice, pursuing instead more comprehensive and
multi-faceted forms of social change.50
In this way, while Schlosberg affirms the centrality of distributive justice, he also
argues for incorporating the ideas of theorist Iris Marion Young and her extensive
consideration of structural factors, which include participation, recognition, and
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capability of marginalized groups, as key elements of justice with which to more
comprehensively address those larger social structures and processes that produce socialenvironmental inequalities and more effectively direct the political efforts of social
movements.51

Contested knowledges
Contested knowledges forms one of the key aspects of the EJ framework in which I
situate the social-environmental dilemma of radioactive contamination throughout the
Techa River Valley. In one sense, it relates to the power embedded in the privilege of
knowledge production, the question of whose voice is authorized to produce knowledge,
and which knowledges are validated as truth. The sociologist, Ulrich Beck, addressed the
problem of power differentials separating scientific knowledge producers from those who
merely carry the impact of decisions executed on the basis of the claims of such
knowledge producers situated in privileged positions of power, particularly in the context
of his theory of the risk society.52 In the risk society, the particular type of risk Beck
refers to is one which is produced as an accidental yet inherent feature of industrialization
and capital-intensive, technological advancements that are supposed to distinguish and
produce a modernized society.53 This particular type of risk is also characterized by a
great deal of uncertainty, in part because it is so new or dangerous to test that the
scientific claims of experts are frequently based on inadequate empirical research, such as
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the tenuous determination of safe levels of toxicity. Despite such uncertainty on the part
of designated experts, their claims generally continue to prevail over the concerns and
first-hand accounts of laypersons who have experienced harm from industrial or
technological sources.54 As Beck argues,
The insistence that connections are not established may look good for a scientist
and be praiseworthy in general. When dealing with risks, the contrary is the case
for the victims; they multiply the risks….If the recognition of a risk is denied on
the basis of an ‘unclear’ state of information, this means that the necessary
counteractions are neglected and the danger grows.55
At the same time, Beck anticipated that his theory of the risk society could lead to a
slippery slope of relativism and unsubstantiated denials of scientific facts. In order to
avoid such potentially dangerous cognitive pitfalls, Beck advocated for a theoretical
approach that acknowledges that there exist both socially constructed and empirically
verifiable aspects to risk as part of his theorization of the heightened risks created by
power differentials between experts’ and laypersons’ competing knowledge claims.56
More directly relating to EJ, the concept of contested knowledges informs
recognition and capability as elements of justice relevant to racial/ethnic and class biases
and the tendency for scientific experts, especially those in positions of power along with
other authority figures, to dismiss the claims of victims, particularly those of rural,
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working class, or otherwise socially marginalized communities, as ignorant.57 In
particular, this tendency characterizes one of the main dilemmas in environmental justice
struggles in the U.S.58 The dismissal of those who are perceived as being uneducated
and/or not trustworthy also plays a role when considering the concept of participation as a
measure of justice. As numerous researchers of EJ cases have shown, marginalized
communities in the U.S. are often deemed too ignorant and indifferent to care about
urban planning and zoning decisions regarding their neighborhoods and are therefore
provided little if any opportunity to access information and participate in the decisionmaking processes that will affect them.59 One of the clearest examples of this in the U.S.
relates to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and affected populations of New Orleans.
Despite toxic contamination pervading neighborhood homes, buildings, outdoor areas,
and water, the EPA had deemed these areas safe enough to return to, whereas
independent tests proved that they were not.60 Similar patterns of sociopolitical exclusion
have historically left vulnerable communities living in the shadow of the PO Mayak
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complex facing an uphill struggle to have their questions and concerns addressed by the
facility’s operators, government leaders, and scientists.61 For this reason, the mobilization
of activists in Russia, just as in Godsil et al.’s case study relating to the aftermath
Hurricane Katrina, has served vital roles to demand official recognition of victimized
communities and their right and capability to know what scientists and state authorities
know, along with the opportunity to actively participate in decision-making processes
that will affect them using that knowledge.62

EJ and Lefebvre’s theory of the social production of space
The preceding overview of EJ illustrates the movement’s emergence out of socially,
historically, politically, and spatially contingent conditions that, despite such
contingency, can nonetheless serve to frame and contest social-environmental inequalities
along racial, ethnic, class, and other markers of difference across the world. In relation to
the sociospatial questions of critical geography and EJ, the theoretical framework of this
research centers on analyzing space itself as a product of society, a concept adopted by
critical geographers from the work of twentieth century French theorist, Henri
Lefebvre.63 In relation to this theoretical framework, I probe the production of space in
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Soviet society—specifically in the post-World War II landscape of the Southern Urals—
which was characterized by social-environmental inequality as a form of structural
violence in the shadow of PO Mayak. Relatedly, as the discovery of the health effects of
river-borne radioactive contamination upon local populations began to reach regional
authorities and scientists, there emerged a new kind of regime in which privileged
knowledge created its own set of subjects. This regime made knowledge about the health
risks which permeated the Techa River Valley accessible only to a minority of elites,
most of whom lived at a safe distance in relatively urbanized areas such as the closed city
of Ozyorsk and as far away as the elite research institutions in Moscow and Leningrad,
while rural communities, whose daily lives depended on the Techa River, continued to
live with its contamination unaware of its inherent risks.64 Therefore, the concrete fact of
proximity to the source of radiation as a direct relationship with lethal health risks, along
with the sociopolitical practices and conditions which restricted access to knowledge
about this spatially-contingent risk is where I see the necessity of placing the production
of space at the center of questions about what was and what was not accidental exposure.
In this way, I situate un-accidental exposure to radiation and this regime of privileged
knowledge as a matter of the unjust production of space. At the same time, however, this
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history exemplifies in concrete terms, Lefebvre’s theorization of the process by which
space is socially produced, along with the set of relations of which it is constituted.65
Numerous scholars attest to the versatility and universal potential of Lefebvre’s
theory which, to provide a truncated summary, proposes that social spaces are social
products.66 That is, social spaces are defined by—and in turn, take an active role in
defining—a given society’s power structures, social relationships, and means of
production. Within the context of Lefebvre’s theory, in considering the case of racist
policies and practices such as segregation, along with its de facto continued existence
after Jim Crow laws were officially dismantled decades ago, the understanding of space
as a social product clarifies the key relationship between the sociopolitical oppression of
African Americans and the institutionalized control of space which exposed—and
continue to expose—these communities disproportionately to the harmful by-products of
industrial production—or waste processing and recycling in certain cases—in a given
society while simultaneously depriving them of equitable access to the benefits of being
active participants and contributors within that society.67 In order to show how
Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space connects with EJ in the U.S. and the
potential for using this theory to frame diverse social-environmental processes across the
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world, I will first clarify Lefebvre’s use of the term “product” to describe and refer to
space. I will then follow this clarification with a consideration of Lefebvre’s attention to
the processual nature of producing space.
First, Lefebvre’s concept of social space as a “product” aims to arrive at a unitary
theory of space that, unlike earlier theories, does not restrict it to being either a purely
abstract idea, nor a geometric materiality, or even specific kinds of social spaces such as
those within urban contexts. Instead, Lefebvre argues for perceiving the multiplicity of
things that space and sociospatial relations encompass:
(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other
products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their
interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity.... At the same time there
is nothing imagined, unreal or ‘ideal’ about it as compared for example, with
science, representations, ideas or dreams.68
A key insight within this conceptualization of the social production of space is that it
illuminates the possibility for a critical framing of non-social processes such as the
physical and chemical mechanics of how toxic substances, for example, behave in the
environment alongside the sociopolitical processes, such as racial segregation or
exploitative labor practices that restrict particular social groups, such as African
Americans and other racial/ethnic minorities, low-income and/or working class
populations, into residences or workplaces where they will be dangerously exposed to
such toxins. At the same time, the multiplicity of space, conceptualized this way,
highlights a versatility that can be usefully applied to a variety of social contexts
throughout the world, particularly in analyzing questions of social-environmental
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conflict. Second, Lefebvre underscores the processual nature of the social production of
space, which, heavily informed by Marxist critiques of capitalism, focuses on making
visible the role of political and economic processes involved, on a continuous and
temporal basis, in producing space. In this way, he builds on the Marxist dialectical
understanding of production and consumption to propose that even as space is “a product
to be used, to be consumed, it is also a means of production; networks of exchange and
flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it.” 69 By
overlapping the concepts of the processual nature of social space while also asserting that
it is an inherent element of a society’s means of production, Lefebvre also aimed to draw
attention to the interrelationships between elements—in particular, the political,
economic, scientific, bureaucratic realms—that work simultaneously and in sync, but
which, as he observed, were too often analyzed in isolation from each other.
This treatment of the interwoven nature of these seemingly discrete realms offers
a framework which supports Taylor’s argument for recognizing, in the American
historical context, the roots of EJ in early civil rights struggles on issues such as racial
segregation, substandard housing conditions for African Americans before 1865, or the
fight for establishing minority workers’ rights in Chicago’s garbage collection and waste
processing services.70 I consider Lefebvre’s emphasis on not only the interrelationships
between the means of production, social division of labor, structures, and superstructures
of modern societies, but also the range of scales from as broad as the globe to as local as
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the body, in which the concrete and abstract aspects of space mesh in ways that do not
follow dualistic schemas.

Globalizing environmental justice
David Harvey shares Lefebvre’s deep engagement with Marxist critiques of capitalism,
as he incorporates and builds on them within his own analyses of sociospatial production.
However, Harvey’s approach to space is set apart by his more rigorous analysis of
capitalist political economy and crises of over-accumulation, particularly throughout late
modernity.71 An important element of his illustration of how capitalist logic has led to
crises of over-accumulation involves drawing connections between the processes and
relationships that are put to work by capitalism to produce space and “spatiotemporal
fixes” to these crises.72 Specifically, in relation to EJ issues, Harvey has contemplated at
length the problem of demonstrating how the political economic logic behind the “spatial
fix” to capitalist crises contributes to environmental injustices in specific ways, such as
the American historical examples discussed above.73 In this way, Harvey argues that
social and environmental justice can and must be made universally relevant.
In Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference, Harvey cites a leaked World
Bank memo in which an influential economist, Lawrence Summers, laments what he
observes as the “under-pollution” of places such as certain countries in Africa, and the
basic idea that such places, invariably of deep and widespread poverty, represent the most
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ideal locations for toxic and heavily polluting industrial operations.74 According to the
neoliberal market logic conveyed in this memo, the externalities or costs of establishing
toxic industries in these countries—as measured in absolute terms in relation to the cost
of treating resultant health impacts—are the lowest, thus rendering these particular sites
the most cost-efficient.75 The hypothetical trade-off for populations in those countries
would be the “welfare-enhancing benefits” of revenue brought in by such industries in
these economically marginalized locations.76
Using the “impeccable economic logic” conveyed in this memo, Harvey
demonstrates how the role of such logic works in ways that have also been shown to
disproportionately afflict racial and ethnic minorities.77 In particular, across all racial and
ethnic categories, working class and low-income populations are caught in such a
position where socioeconomic and environmental vulnerability is turned into market
value.78 Noting the prevalence of cost-benefit analyses in contributing to situations of
environmental injustice, Harvey writes: “Money is always a form of social power and an
instrument of discipline in social relations rather than a neutral universal equivalent with
which to calculate ‘welfare-enhancing benefits.’” 79 Furthermore, he anchors this
connection between cost-benefit analyses and the production of space carried out on
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terms of uneven social relations in which money and the question of “welfare-enhancing
benefits” serving as a disciplinary instrument in neoliberal, capitalist economic logic,
more often than not, renders those who are the most economically and politically
disenfranchised the “losers” of sociospatial production.
In the context of EJ issues in the U.S., Harvey cited a public health research
finding in which a highly disproportionate amount of minority and low-income children
under six years of age in Baltimore had been found to have elevated lead amounts in their
blood or suffered from blood poisoning.80 As Harvey pointed out, most of these children
lived in neighborhoods that are characterized by poorly maintained housing, and where
lead paint was prevalent throughout their homes despite having already been banned
about twenty years prior to the time during which the cited study took place.
Furthermore, he noted that the economic rationale of cost-benefit analyses played a key
role in the production of these lethally toxic homes and multiple generations of children
with jeopardized health and uncertain futures: “[T]he costs of lead-removal would either
drive rents up or render inner-city landlordism of the poor so unprofitable as to
exacerbate the already serious problems of housing abandonment.” 81 This example of the
relationship between poisoned generations of inner-city residents and capitalist logic in
the production of urban space is also captured by Harvey’s concept of the “spatial fix”:
...[The “spatial fix is] one of the central contradictions of capital: that it has to
build a fixed space...necessary for its own functioning at a certain point in its
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history only to have to destroy that space (and devalue much of the capital
invested therein) at a later point in order to make way for a new “spatial fix”
(openings for fresh accumulation in new spaces and territories)….82
By following Harvey’s explanation of how capitalism “fixes” crises of over-accumulation
spatially and socially, one can see that the same rationale that justifies allowing
impoverished residents to live indefinitely in decaying, lethally toxic homes and
neighborhoods, perpetuated by the social and legal structure of property relationships, as
framed in Lefebvre’s conceptualization of space and society, may later on re-emerge as
the “urban renewal” logic that razes, then prices longtime residents out of those homes in
order to “clean up” a neighborhood, in favor of newly built housing that, as is often the
case, may then be prohibitively expensive for the former residents.83 The underlying
social relationship forged from this rationale is one in which certain groups, marked by
class, race, ethnicity, or any one of many markers of marginalization and vulnerability,
face structural, societal obstacles in accessing the legal and political process to determine
the terms of where and in what conditions they can live.
As Harvey observes, this intersection between sociospatial disenfranchisement
and greater physical and mental health risks, parallels the inequitable sociospatial
relationships that are among the central objects of critique by EJ movements across the
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world, sometimes employing terms such as “environmentalism of the poor.” 84 It is also
precisely this same kind of uneven social and political relationship and process of
producing space that, through the symbolism of money as a “welfare-enhancing benefit,”
will often pit such groups against each other, whether they are indigenous groups “fixed”
in reservations or other economically depressed landscapes, or countries with struggling
economies, each competing and sometimes even opposing EJ activism against the
dangerously close siting of heavily polluting industries, in order to “accommodate the
waste in return for money incomes.” 85 In the case of the Techa River Valley in the
present day, such conflict pits local social-environmental activists against the same
economically struggling communities that are the most heavily impacted by the legacy of
contamination. These communities’ prospects for survival and prosperity are eclipsed by
chronic unemployment, devaluation of local land, and the stigma attached to local
landscapes which are now associated with contamination.86
With the aim of visualizing a possibility for the unison of otherwise disparate
groups that have been socially, politically, and environmentally disenfranchised and
dislocated, Harvey advocates for the recognition of the relationality entwining their fates.
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As he dares to hope, grassroots EJ movements in these disparate, far-flung places across
the world can “adopt a politics of abstraction capable of reaching out across space, across
the multiple environmental and social conditions that constitute the geography of
difference” and realize the universal potential of these movements.87

Marxist dialectical thought and Soviet discourse on social-environmental relations
In the context of how Marxist ideas were put to work in the Soviet Union throughout its
history, the concept of the dialectic took on a prominent role in official discourse.88
However, numerous Western European and Anglo-American Marxist theorists and
political ecologists point out ways in which prevailing Soviet discourse regarding naturesociety and human-environment relations reified dualistic concepts. Drawing from Alfred
Schmidt’s critique of Friedrich Engels’ application of dialectical thinking to nature, Neil
Smith notes that, especially throughout Stalin’s years of leadership in the Soviet Union,
Engels’ adaptation of the “dialectic of nature” became rigidly “codified as official Soviet
doctrine,” constructing nature as “external to human society” as in a dualistic, rather than
truly dialectical sense.89 Andy Bruno observes patterns of this Stalinist version the
nature-society dialectic through his environmental-historical research on Soviet
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industrialization in the Arctic region.90 While Bruno does not believe Stalin espoused an
inherently hostile or antagonistic position towards nature, he finds that one of the main
guiding premises underlying Stalinist dialecticism of Soviet planners aiming to bring
industrial development to the Khibiny Mountains of Kola Peninsula framed humans and
the non-human realm as a dualistic power struggle based on “[d]ominance over nature.”91
In this way, the Stalinist brand of dialecticism manifest in “discussions about how polar
nature would be improved through human activities” while also aggressively “severing
dependence on the non-human world” 92 At the same time, such plans were framed with
the vision of striving towards a classless, socialist utopia. Another important dimension
of Stalin’s nature-society dialectic that distinctly positions it at odds with political
ecology relates to its dogmatic framing as a “science.” 93 Referring to the Stalinist-era
development of the “science of dialectics,” Loftus makes note of Hungarian Marxist
theorist György Lukács’ criticism of Soviet dialecticians’ adoption of positivism in the
science of dialectics, along with its implicit technological determinism and tendency
towards reifying dualism, as mentioned above.94 In particular, Loftus sees Lukács’
opposition to the tendency of Soviet dialecticians, such as Nikolai Bukharin, as wrongly
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attempting to fit the principles of physical science and “subject-object dualism” to the
study of social phenomena.95 In other words, Lukács railed against what he perceived in
Soviet intellectual work as a trend towards an uncritical hegemony of knowledge
production that was forgetting its Marxist disposition for approaching social questions
with the awareness of power relations embedded in social reality instead of accepting
them as given phenomena.
Such critiques are specifically directed against the “scientific Marxism” that
gained its momentum during Stalin’s years, 1924-1953.96 However, it is worth being
cautious against allowing Stalin’s three-decade long shadow to obscure one’s view of the
heterogeneity within Soviet history. In this sense, notable works from the late Soviet
years indicate that Soviet intellectuals and scientists had begun to adopt reflexive
approaches to the concept of dialectics and the conceptualization of nature and society.
For example, in a 1975 essay engaging with theoretical directions in Soviet geography,
geographer Vsevolod Anuchin points to the need to overcome dualistic perspectives of
society and ecology, which tended to be separated within the broader field of geography
in the Soviet Union as the “landscape sphere” and “geographical environment” subfields,
respectively.97 Anuchin argues that this dualistic separation of nature and society had
become a serious obstacle for the intellectual growth of theory and practice in geography.
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Although by dwelling on concepts of scientific laws within geography, society, and
nature Anuchin still demonstrates a lingering influence of positivism rooted in Stalinist
“scientific Marxism,” he also expresses a clear departure from the discourse based on the
conquest of nature that had prevailed in previous decades. As he writes:
Now when intensified specialization and the one-sided development of science
and its use in practical affairs have proved inadequate, when we are confronted by
the disruption of the overall link between phenomena, which development in its
turn places the very life of [humankind] under threat, scientists must set
themselves the task of elaborating scientific synthesis, start to blur the dividing
lines between sciences, in particular between the sciences concerned with nature
and those concerned with the development of society.98
Missing from this discourse is a concern for the power relations within which such
development occurs as well as attention to questions about inequitable social relations.
The absence of such discussion may be related to what the scholar of Russian
environmental history, Douglas R. Weiner believes relates to a characteristic strategy of
Soviet scientists since the late 1920s to avoid framing their arguments in terms of moral
concerns, but rather within strictly scientific rationales instead.99 As he writes, in contrast
to scientists’ relative freedom to express ethical views during the Soviet years that
preceded Stalin’s rule, scientists’ re-framing of ecological concerns as “an exclusively
‘scientific’ problem of ecology was an adaptive response by movement leaders, who
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recognized that the Bolsheviks might heed those speaking in science’s name but might
persecute those who advanced ‘moral’ arguments for policy.” 100
Despite Anuchin’s apparent belaboring of the issue of treating the nature-society
dialectic solely in terms of advancing science while omitting questions of social and
political relations—a possible discursive strategy with a long and complex history, as
Weiner’s study illustrates—this excerpt indicates that it is inaccurate to portray the Soviet
scientific community as an unchanging monolith that remained perpetually stuck in
Stalin’s dogmatic dialecticism. Instead, Anuchin’s concern regarding the need for science
to conceptually integrate humans and nature suggests that Soviet scientists and theorists
made reflexive and self-conscious efforts to confront and correct what some viewed as
flawed premises.

Anglophone Marxist ideas and Soviet science: epistemological differences
Apart from the dialectical conceptualization of nature and society, there is a second
important area that takes on a key role within Anglophone and Western European
arguments on Marxist theorizations of the relationship between social and environmental
justice. In a way that relates to the elevation of the science of dialectics to a positivist and
hegemonic mode of Stalinist knowledge production, Anglophone and Western European
political ecologists have critiqued similar tendencies in hegemonic systems of knowledge
production within capitalist societies. As geographer Roderick Neumann has noted in his
comprehensive review and illuminating discussion of the multi-dimensional development
and scope of the field of political ecology along with its theoretical, methodological, and
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practical applications, among the defining characteristics of scholars whose works have
later been identified as forerunners has been a critical approach towards knowledge
production, and the adoption of analytical frameworks that do not take scientific
knowledge as absolute or objective truth.101 In other words, political ecology upholds the
idea, along similar lines as Lukács’ criticism of the Stalinist science of dialectics, that
scientific knowledge—biophysical, sociocultural, ecological, etc.—is socially constructed
and thus needs to be viewed critically.102 This is not to confuse the world itself as
inherently “socially constructed,” but to acknowledge that scientists, as human beings,
cannot entirely avoid their own positionality as they formulate particular questions about
particular objects.103 For this reason, the production of scientific knowledge requires
rigorous critique, peer review, and consensus as a check against bias.104 These aspects of
the scientific method form part of what lends science its reliability and validity as a way
of approaching knowledge of the world.105 Furthermore, they help avoid both the
insufficiently rigorous and overly relativist analyses of anti-scientific stances—common
in climate change denial or creationism, for example—yet allow self-reflexivity and
attention to contingency of specific histories and geographies as well as the important
roles of sociopolitical relations and power differentials in the process of inquiry.
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Particularly relevant for EJ, is that these approaches allow for questions regarding the
subjectivity of scientists who investigate the impacts of environmental damage on
populations. As numerous EJ scholars and social theorists have noted, the authority
invested in scientists representing state or corporate interests enables their findings
regarding social-environmental conflict, such as the environmental and health impacts of
toxic exposure, for example, to be accepted as truth, even though closer scrutiny has
revealed serious biases, flaws or insufficiently rigorous analysis in such research.106
In the case of the health and social impacts of radioactive contamination from the
PO Mayak complex in Russia, after the existence of the facility and its history of
pollution was officially acknowledged in the late 1980s, scientists responding to rural
residents’ claims of victimization by unchecked radioactive pollution from the Mayak
plant demonstrated a tendency to dismiss suspicions regarding the connection between
radioactive contamination and symptoms of radiation illness by portraying claims as
schemes for extorting compensation from the state and resorting to criticism of victims’
lifestyles such as the high incidence of alcohol abuse.107 Such portrayals of the
populations most exposed to contamination—largely rural—betray scientists’ class biases
in how they perceived rural and working class populations. As Edelstein and
Tysiachniouk note, this reflects attitudes that have persisted since the far into the Soviet
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period.108 The tendency for scientific authority to undermine local residents’
contestations of established scientific knowledge, often by making implicit references to
their rural and lower class backgrounds in order to cast doubt upon their credibility,
reflects an aspect of social and environmental injustice that relates not merely to matters
of inequality, but to recognition, capability, and participation of victims, all of which
refer back to the broader sociopolitical structures and conditions which are responsible
for creating inequality itself.109

Soviet science vs. social and environmental justice
The preceding sketch of the intellectual heritage of Marxist critical theory, specifically in
terms of conceptualizing nature-society relations, shared by the Soviet status quo and
Anglophone as well as Western European Marxist thought demonstrates how wildly the
interpretations of Marxist critical theory can diverge. In this respect, it is worth
contemplating Lefebvre’s questioning of whether or not Soviet socialism was succeeding
in creating a revolutionary social space, and whether or not Soviet society could indeed
be defined as “real” socialism or communism—that is, an actual alternative to capitalist
production of space. By way of expressing his own doubts, Lefebvre outlined what he
considered two options for a socialist society to proceed, the first of which seems to
imply what he considered to be the path taken by the Soviet Union, the second being the
ideal alternative he envisioned:
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The first of these would opt for accelerating growth, whatever the cost, whether
for competition, prestige, or power. According to this scenario, state socialism
would aim to do no more than perfect capitalist strategies of growth, relying
entirely on the proven strengths of large-scale enterprise and large cities, the latter
constituting at once great centres of production and great centres of political
power...The second strategy would be founded on small and medium-sized
businesses and on towns of a size compatible with that emphasis...The inevitable
urbanization of society would not take place at the expense of whole sectors, nor
would it exacerbate unevenness in growth or development....110
The first scenario, particularly with the emphasis on “competition, prestige, and power,”
seems to depict Stalin’s role in shaping Soviet society, space and politics. His largerthan-life drive and support for industrial growth and production,111 and the oppression of
peasants, particularly in the context of the not-so-accidental 1930s famines which
devastated rural populations the most,112 also serve as concrete examples of extreme
“inequalities in development and the abandonment of whole legions...of the
population”.113 However, while this may be a fair assessment of some of the key ways in
which Soviet sociospatial inequalities developed under Stalin’s leadership, the portrayal
is incomplete if it does not consider the geopolitical context of that period in time, along
with corresponding factors that could help explain Stalin’s perceived need to consolidate
political and economic power, particularly through the acceleration of industrial growth
at any cost. As Ronald Grigor Suny describes the chaotic situation of the earliest years of
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the new Bolshevik government, “Russia slid into civil war, [and] the Bolsheviks
embarked on a program of regenerating state power that involved economic
centralization and the use of violence and terror against their opponents.” 114
Soviet society, as much as its leadership attempted to insulate itself from potential
opponents and intervention, did not develop in isolation but rather in inescapable
relationality with the rest of the world.115 Therefore, I argue that geopolitical contexts
must be included in an analysis of how society, space, and power relations developed—
all relevant aspects of an EJ theoretical framework—during this period of Soviet history.
The absence of substantial consideration of such geopolitical contexts in Lefebvre’s
discussion of “socialist” space in the Soviet context amounts to one of the key flaws in
his criticism of it.
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CHAPTER III: SOCIOSPATIAL INEQUALITY IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET
HISTORY
Introduction
In the United States, the pioneers of EJ made poignantly visible the environmental and
spatial manifestations of Jim Crow, environmental racism, and other forms of social
inequality and structural violence experienced by socially and economically marginalized
populations. EJ scholars have shown that the roots of the sociospatial production of
environmental injustice in its American context were borne out of not only racist
ideologies and attitudes but also a political economic rationale on which institutionalized
racism was structured.116 The field of environmental justice has also proved invaluable in
recognizing social-environmental inequality outside of the American historical contexts
in which it developed. However, synthesizing theoretical approaches to address Soviet
social-environmental inequalities also requires centering the distinct history of Russia and
the former Soviet Union in the context of its distinct space and place. In this chapter, I
will first present a brief overview of historical contexts of social difference and structural
violence in Russian and Soviet history. This will draw particular attention to the tsarist
control of space to maximize its power over the Russia Empire’s subjects and how it
produced sociospatial inequalities. Second, I will consider the changes introduced by the
Bolsheviks’ ascent to power, specifically in relation to the implementation of policies
intended to promote social equality, and how Joseph Stalin shaped the fate of such
policies. Third, I will briefly review selected literature engaging with Soviets’ concern
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with national minorities and its implications for the development of Soviet identities,
social relations, national belonging, the special significance of the Great Patriotic War,
and how this history impacts social relations in Russia today. Following this discussion
of the legacy of Soviet national identities, I will focus on the Southern Urals at the dawn
of the Atomic Age and the production of sociospatial inequality before the contamination
of the Techa River Valley occurred.

Violence and Space in the Russian Empire
In the history of Russia and of the lands once encompassed by the Soviet Union as well
as the Russian empire, one can also recognize unjust social relations that resulted in
systemic oppression and other-ing, rooted in ideology as well as economic exploitation
in relation to colonization. However, there are also two aspects of this history that defy
drawing easy parallels with other colonial histories and which render Eurasia a special
case. First, Eurasia is characterized by a territorial contiguity that has enabled
movements of and encounters between a very heterogeneous range of peoples,
throughout a much longer stretch of time than that for which we have comparable
records in relation to the Americas.117 Second, the Russian Empire’s turn towards
global markets also warrants special consideration. As some of the most defining
aspects of the Americas’ role in the Atlantic slave trade are related to the development
of a global capitalist system in tandem with modernization and colonialism,118 it is
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worth considering aspects of Russia’s colonial history that relate more directly to the
emergence of capitalism in conjunction with imperial ventures and how they
influenced the treatment of social difference in Russian society.
As Tlostandova and Mignolo observe of the legacy of the Russian empire,
particularly since the seventeenth century, it is characterized by state-society relations
that were defined by oppression, dislocation, and symbolic as well as concrete
violence.119 Such an observation gives rise to the questions of who oppressed whom?
Who was dislocated, from where to where? Who inflicted violence upon whom? To
address these questions, I begin by noting that social difference in Russian society
throughout its history can be read not only along ethnic lines. Other markers of
difference such as religion and class have carried as much, if not greater, weight in
terms of belonging and otherness.120 Along with social or class status, racial, ethnic, and
religious difference were all cause for being marked as “others” and oppressed.121
However, historian Michael Khodarkovsky notes that instead of the concept of race or
ethnicity, “[s]eparateness or foreignness was defined through language, territory,

119

Madina V. Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo, Learning to Unlearn: Decolonial Reflections from
Eurasia and the Americas (Transoceanic Series), (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2012).

120

Michael Khodarkovsky, “Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects," in Russia’s Orient: Imperial
Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917, Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (Eds.), (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 9-26.

121

Mark Bassin, “Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian East in the Early 19th Century,” American
Historical Review, 96(3) June 1991: 763-94; Kevin Alan Brook, The Jews of Khazaria, (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006); Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the
USSR, and the Successor States, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Tlostanova and Mignolo,
Learning to Unlearn.

47

kinship, or religion.” 122 Contrary to Khodarkovsky, Bassin finds that indigenous
groups, especially native Siberian peoples, were frequently portrayed in Russian
literature and artistic depictions as primitives to be conquered, explicitly evoking
American pioneers’ encounters and subjugation of indigenous groups in North
America, in ways that reflect racialized discourses of difference.123 At the same time,
tsarist officials forced Siberian indigenous groups to pay tribute in the form of animal
furs or iasak to supply the Russian empire's global fur trade as one of its main sources
of wealth.124
In relation to religion and ethnicity, two of the many examples of state-endorsed
violence framed within discourses of religious or ethnic difference include the massacre
and forced exile of ethnic groups such as the Ingush, Chechens, Dagestanis, and
Circassians/Cherkess, among others—some of whom were erroneously assumed to be
Muslim at the time—from the Caucasus region and Black Sea coast, and forcibly exiled
to distant lands such as Ottoman Turkey.125 Similarly, Jewish populations experienced
brutal pogroms and other forms of violent persecution and discrimination at the hands of
imperial forces as well as civilians across several centuries, particularly along the western
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regions of the empire, notably the Pale of Settlement to which they were restricted.126
Ethnic Russian peasants, particularly those who were perpetually tied to labor as serfs for
landowners and made up a large portion of the population, suffered increasing
oppression, particularly as a result of a set of restrictive laws established by Tsar Peter I
(reign: 1682-1721) to curtail serfs’ mobility and curb their tendency to desert
landowners.127

Brief history of the Southern Urals
The region I refer to as the Southern Urals, where Chelyabinsk Oblast was officially
established in 1934, shares with the broader Eurasian steppe within which it is situated an
ancient and complex history of human settlement and civilization, marked by continuous
encounters, both tumultuous and peaceful, across millennia. During the early modern era,
this region had been inhabited by Tatars, along with numerous other distinct ethnic
groups, a large proportion of which included the nomadic Bashkirs of Turkic origins.128
The reign of Ivan III of Muscovy in the 15th century marks the key turning point in the
early modern history of Eurasia as he led decisive victories against the dominant Tatars
of that period and began to conquer and consolidate the lands that eventually became the
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core of the Russian empire.129 He also propelled Russia’s quest to accumulate wealth
oriented towards the lucrative European fur market.130 The move to capitalize on
Europe’s high demand for sable furs led to the first official Russian encounters with
Bashkirs with whom they formed contractual relationships. This mainly consisted of
requiring Bashkirs to pay iasak to the Grand Prince Ivan III—as was required of the
Siberian indigenous groups—in the form of pelts from sable and other animal species
targeted for their fur.131 As Muscovy grew into the Tsardom of Russia in the 16th
century, encounters escalated from payments of tribute to land-grabbing underwritten by
the tsar. This practice served to entice Russian peasants to settle what were then
considered Russia’s “borderlands” in order to establish Russian territory. In many cases,
Russian peasants pursued these rare opportunities to escape serfdom.132 In response, the
Bashkirs mounted continuous and violent resistance to Russian encroachment and the
seizing of land.133 Additionally, while the Russian Empire had not always aimed to
persecute Muslims, and in fact, at the time even encouraged “pagan” groups to convert to
Islam, the central role of the Russian Orthodox religion in Russian identity always cast a
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stark light of “otherness” upon non-Christians, including the Bashkirs, the majority of
whom have historically practiced Islam.134

Restriction of liberties and land rights for Russian serfs and ethnic minorities
In the history of Russia and the lands once forming part of the Soviet Union as well as the
Russian empire, one can recognize parallels and continuities in the power relations that
defined these societies, despite the stark ideological differences between tsarist and
Soviet governing institutions. Furthermore, such parallels and continuities share distinctly
spatial concerns which have played key roles in not only domestic authoritarian practices,
but also colonial practices in Eurasian history. For example, during the tsarist era,
particularly from approximately the end of the seventeenth century until the revolutionary
years of the early twentieth century, an internal passport system was developed which
required all subjects of the Russian Empire to be registered with their local authorities
from birth.135 Writing in 1920 for The Socialist Review, economist Isaac A. Hourwich,
who had emigrated from the Russian empire before the Russian Revolution, warned
against increased policing in American society by recounting the oppressive practices of
the then recently dismantled tsarist regime of Russia. As he noted, this internal passport
system had made it mandatory to always carry one’s passport as well as written
permission to travel from one’s superiors, usually the landowner in the case of serfs,
whenever traveling the equivalent of twenty miles or more from one’s registered place of
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residence.136 Emphasizing the severity of this law’s enforcement, Hourwich pointed out
that since one could not prove having permanent residence without a passport, a “person
who had no ‘permanent place of abode’ was liable to deportation to Siberia on the charge
of vagrancy.”137
Literature drawing connections between the Enlightenment and social engineering
practices in modern history has reflected upon the implications of tsarist Russia’s
exceptional preoccupation with tracking its population and restricting its mobility across
the empire’s vast expanse. Importantly, as noted by James Scott in his study of social
engineering schemes during Russia’s imperial era as well as the Soviet period, being able
to count and track individuals served the important purpose of collecting taxes,
organizing recruitments for military service, and maintaining social order by policing
movement and preventing serfs from deserting landowners.138 Similarly, the internal
passport system formed a key aspect of the means by which the population was restrained
and made legible to authorities in the face of sprawling territory and inscrutable
wilderness across the Eurasian landmass.
Apart from serving as a deterrent for serfs and soldiers who would be inclined to
flee to freedom, the internal passport system also enabled the control of ethnic minorities
by making it easier to restrict their movement. Among the most well-known examples of
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such restrictions is often termed the “Pale of Settlement,” a territory along the western
edges of the Russian empire, encompassing portions of present-day Lithuania, Poland,
Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. With few exceptions, Russian imperial law, from 1719
until 1897, when such restrictions slowly began to be abolished, Jewish citizens were
prohibited from permanently residing outside of the “Pale of Settlement.”139 In the case
of other ethnic minorities, this distinct characteristic of the tsarist form of rule, with its
extraordinary investment in the control of its subjects’ movements, created particular
hardships for traditionally nomadic ethnic groups of the steppe regions along the southern
and Central Asian regions of the empire. As Mikhail Khodarkovsky’s detailed accounts
illustrate regarding the encounters between representatives of the tsars and the many
nomadic tribes of the southern steppes over the course of three centuries, the Russian
empire learned to contain and subdue the “wild” nomads via persistent encroachment
towards the south and southeastern regions towards Central Asia.140 His analysis of
tsarist-era documents demonstrates that a key aspect of the Russian empire’s strategy for
expanding and colonizing these regions involved freeing a certain number of serfs and
utilizing them to settle borderlands.141 Settlements would eventually be followed by
military fortifications in order to gradually build up bases and cities, creating enclosures
and barriers impeding nomads’ access to grazing lands for their herds and traditional
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traveling routes.142 Ultimately, Russia’s constant and increasingly technologically
advanced aggressions along the steppe borderlands simultaneously led to the demise of
nomadism across the steppe and enabled the conquest of the dislocated nomadic steppe
tribes.143 In this way, non-Russian captives, particularly those captured in battles across
the fiercely contentious southern and southeastern steppes and Central Asia during the
late eighteenth century were forced into serfdom.144 A large portion of these non-Russian
captives hailed from Tatar as well as Bashkir tribes whose territory encompassed steppe
lands that included what is now known as the Southern Urals. As the empire’s reach
enveloped these lands, the Tatar and Bashkir grazing lands eventually gave way to fixed
landscapes of farms and factories.145
The sense of loss and continuously increased policing from tsarist forces fueled the
Bashkir separatist aims well into the revolutionary years of the early twentieth century.
During the Civil War, as the Urals region was among the most embattled areas with
heavy fighting, Bashkirs suffered high losses. Following the war, the collectivization of
farms contributed to dramatic drops in the Bashkir population of the Urals as a result of
both death and mass exodus. Along with the loss of lives, collectivization, with few
exceptions, also brought about the end of nomadism and its time-tested relationship with
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the particular ecologies of the steppe. Yet, with a promise of hope, the Bolsheviks
ushered in a semblance of improvement in social relations. In this way, one of the most
notable ways by which Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the first leader of the new socialist state,
aimed to promote equality was the implementation of korenizatsiya or the nationalities
policy by which the Soviet government granted to non-Russian ethnic groups official
recognition as national entities, in the form of territory, language freedom or the
opportunity to construct a national language, and representation in government
leadership. Korenizatsiya, often remembered for the slogan, “national in form, socialist in
content,” enacted Lenin’s answer to the social and territorial dislocation as well as
coercive cultural assimilation imposed upon colonized populations not only under the
Russian empire, but also, in a global sense, Western European imperial aggressions.
On the question of colonialism and all forms of social inequality, official Soviet
ideological discourse aligned with other contemporary socialist movements in direct
opposition to such forms of oppression.146 In this spirit, Lenin instituted a program of
korenizatsiya whereby the Soviet government strove to allocate territorial and linguistic
recognition for all of the ethnic groups which had once been subjected to enslavement,
Russification, and conversion to Orthodox Christianity during the tsarist era.147 However,
upon Lenin’s death in 1924 and Stalin’s ascension to power, Stalin put further
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development of korenizatsiya on hold, and proclaimed the need to institute Russian as the
main language of the Soviet Union, while declaring the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic (RSFSR) as the “big brother” of all Soviet republics.148 In practice,
this signaled the return to tsarist-era Russification over the next few years. Additionally,
Stalin denounced what he perceived as increasingly oppressive conditions for ethnic
Russians, and by 1938, the period of opportunities for ethnic minorities to nurture their
socialist solidarity with free reign to maintain distinct national identities had begun to
end. In conjunction with Stalin’s characteristically deep distrust of minorities, the purges
of minority leaders followed not far behind the shelving of korenizatsiya. In this way, the
revolutionary internationalist ideals of equality and emancipation of minorities and other
oppressed groups no longer remained at the top of the Soviet agenda except in lip service
and ceremonial spectacle.
On this point, one of the most respected preeminent geographers of the Southern
Urals region during the Soviet period, Fyodor Y. Kirin, wrote in 1954 in unpublished
lecture notes, held at the Joint State Archives of Chelyabinsk Oblast (OGAChO), the
following passage:
The significance of the RSFSR as a part of the whole Soviet Union is defined not
only by the sheer expanse of her territory, population, and economy, but also the
leading role of the great russkogo naroda [specific term for Russians as an ethnic
group] in the history of our country’s development, in the construction of
socialism, in the defense of the Motherland during the Great Patriotic War, and
economic development during the postwar era. The RSFSR is the most
multinational republic of all the republics within the Soviet Union. But the
overwhelming majority of the population in the RSFSR - approximately 92
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million out of 112 million, or 82 per cent - is made up of russkiye [ethnic
Russians].
This is why the republic carries the name of this great [ethnic] people.
Apart from [ethnic] Russians, many other ethnic peoples live in the
RSFSR: Tatar, Bashkir, Jewish, Chuvash, Udmurt, Mari, Komi, Kumyk, Laki,
Avartsi, Lezgin, Ossetian, Kabardino, Cherkessian, Adygean, Altai, Khakassian,
Buryat, Yakut, Nenet, Yevenk, and many others, all comprising about 20 million
people or 18% of the population. In tsarist Russia, all of these ethnic groups lived
in miserable conditions.
I. V. Stalin noted,
“The politics of tsarism, the policies of landowners, and bourgeoisie impacted
these peoples in such a way so as to suppress the formation of nationhood, cripple
their culture, stifle their language, keep them oblivious, and finally, to Russify by
any means possible.”
The victory of the great October revolutionary solidarity brought complete
freedom to all the peoples of Russia, and the Leninist national policy ensured for
them the right to cultural development, national in form and socialist in content,
the right to their own nationhood.149
This sentiment reflects one of the predominant Russocentric Soviet attitudes towards the
symbolic positions of the diverse Soviet republics and ethnic minorities in relation to
Russia and ethnic Russians, particularly during Stalin’s rule from 1924 to 1953 along
with the ironies that emerged in Stalin’s actual treatment of minorities, vis-à-vis the
official Soviet rhetoric.150 Its inclusion within the unpublished lectures of one of the most
prominent and well-respected geographers of Chelyabinsk oblast during the postwar
period suggests that nationalist conceptualizations of ethnic identity, territorial belonging,
were widely accepted, even among intellectuals who otherwise appear sufficiently wellversed in Marxist-Leninist principles, and would therefore be expected to roundly reject
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nationalistic chauvinism as a bourgeois malaise that stood in contradiction with
egalitarian socialist principles.151

The formation of a Soviet national identity and its legacy
Contemplating the transition from revolutionary ideals of internationalism to a more
hegemonic and Russocentric Soviet nationalism requires a consideration of the
heterogeneous, multidimensional, and often self-contradictory nature of Soviet national
identities. The relevance of understanding such identities can help place the existence of
social difference in the Soviet Union into clearer context, particularly in terms of the
Southern Urals region. In this section, I will consider insights from literature regarding
the formation of Soviet national identities in relation to the promotion of nationalism and
reification of ethnic difference and territory as a transitional stage towards borderless
proletarian unity and the Soviet Union’s construction of relationships between society
and the state as well as the legacy of the Great Patriotic War, as the Second World War is
known in Russia. These aspects of Soviet identity formation continue to influence
national identities in Russia and former Soviet countries in ways that warrant attention as
they continue to play important roles in present-day social and political situations. By
taking particular note of the multidimensional and contradictions within these aspects of
Soviet identity formation, I also aim to illustrate the need to question oversimplifications
of the Soviet past and present-day political issues in Russia and Eurasia.
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Soviet national identities: empire or the international proletariat’s fatherland?
Numerous scholars agree that despite the Soviet Union’s official denunciation of
imperialism, and the Bolsheviks’ acceleration towards a visionary future of emancipated
societies, the imperial character of power relations in the Soviet state, in key aspects, bore
the old empire’s lingering imprints. Scholars cite such policies as forced collectivization,
repression of cultural and spiritual practices and traditional livelihoods, Russification, the
imposition of often arbitrary or ill-fitting ethnic and/or national identities and territorial
boundaries, the sometimes destructive cooptation of land and resources, and the
marginalization of Othered histories, as a few of the examples of the imperialist nature of
the Soviet state’s relationship with its citizens.152 At the same time, however, to
uncritically accept the portrayal of the Soviet Union as simply an upgraded version of the
Russian Empire would be to overlook the historical importance of the active effort
exerted by the most earnest and visionary revolutionary intellectuals in their attempt to
construct a new kind of international kinship and identity modeled on Marx’s
revolutionary ideal of a proletarian internationalist and egalitarian society.153 This vision
proposed that the solidarity of workers of all nations would transcend the burdens and
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divisions of national, ethnic, or racial identities as such divisions served only the interests
of bourgeoisie and capitalists. 154
While critics such as Tlostanova and Mignolo may dismiss such discourse as
empty lip service, one can argue that Vladimir Lenin’s emphatic declarations in
recognizing the “right of nations to self-determination,” even at the discursive level, bore
powerful significance on political consciousness at a global scale at the turn of the
twentieth century, as imperial regimes were still the predominant norm across the world
at that point in time.155 In the midst of ongoing debates regarding various approaches to
the “question of nationalism” among revolutionary intellectuals throughout Europe—
particularly one of the most active and prolific contemporary socialist theorists, Rosa
Luxemburg—Lenin documented the 1896 Resolution of the London International
Congress [a congress of the socialist Second International] calling for the “unequivocal
recognition of the full right of all nations to self-determination” in conjunction with “the
equally unambiguous appeal to the workers for international unity in their class
struggle.” 156 Throughout the revolutionary years leading up to victorious formation of
the Soviet Union, Lenin maintained this stance on balancing the independence of nationstates with the Marxist ideal of international proletariat unity.157 However, as Suny
observes, upon Lenin’s death and the rise of his successor, Joseph Stalin, the “question of
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nationalism” began veering away from the vision of socialist internationalism, and more
towards a Soviet, yet Russocentric, nationalist identity.158 Stalin, within his first few
years as the new leader of the Soviet Union, began showing inklings of his stark
divergence from the early socialist revolutionary ideals by declaring “that the proletariat
now had a fatherland.” 159 By upholding the idea of a centralized nationalism with which
workers should identify, instead of the internationalist concept of borderless proletarian
unity, Stalin opened up the opportunity for the Soviet state to begin taking on an imperial
character.
At the same time, the sentimentality of rhetoric conjuring the image of a
“fatherland,” “motherland,” or “homeland” had the potential of appealing to the
emotional sensibilities of the Soviet masses, Russian and non-Russian alike, and, as Suny
points out, the use of emotive language in Soviet discourse helped to not only build a
Soviet national identity, but more importantly, one that fostered an “affective
community” among citizens.160 Suny’s argument poses a potentially more significant
challenge to narratives that characterize the Soviet state as an empire as he highlights the
development of Soviet identities among a broad range of citizens, in contrast to the
Russian empire’s appeal to social elites or Russian Orthodox devotees. To be sure, Suny
acknowledges critical exceptions, particularly among the most severely oppressed victims
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of Soviet policies and practices, yet he asserts that many citizens experienced an
emotional bond through which “millions of people felt attachment to the Soviet Union,
ready to defend it, die and kill for it, and embrace it as Rodina (Motherland).” 161
Additionally, Suny argues that the creation of this affective community decisively sets
the Soviet Union apart from the tsarist empire. A major point supporting his position
relates to the distance and foreignness that historically set the tsar apart from the vast
majority of the Russian and non-Russian populations, as the tsars throughout the Russian
Empire’s history generally would not have seen a need to forge a particularly emotive
attachment to the empire among all the masses beyond a sense of mystified awe and
submission as the tsars’ power was one which was “sanctioned by claims to divine favor
and dynastic legacy.”162

Nationalism vs. proletarian internationalism in the formation of Soviet identities
Observers have commented on the complex and sometimes paradoxical implications of
the Soviet Union’s policy of privileging nationality as a meaningful, though essentialized,
category that would help integrate formerly colonized, non-Russian groups into a new
kind of egalitarian, yet multinational, socialist state, even while aiming, as an abstract,
long-term goal, for the state’s “evolution” beyond national and ethnic distinctions to a
utopian stage in which the proletarian identity would finally be the only meaningful
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identity.163 As Suny points out, this policy, put into practice through such compulsory
means as the dual identity categories on Soviet passports, had the effect of requiring
citizens to perform what historian Francine Hirsch has termed “double assimilation”—
that is, living up to their particular officially ascribed ethno-national category as well as
the greater, unified Soviet identity.164 As historian Yuri Slezkine eloquently articulated in
his in-depth discussion of the Soviet Union’s institutionalization of ethnic particularism,
the nationalization-to-denationalization vision was riddled with such contradictions.165
However, as Hirsch notes, the Soviet Union faced uncharted territory as it ventured into a
completely new and unprecedented kind of state and society.166 If any similar attempt to
dismantle an empire and institutionalize egalitarian relationships among the “oppressed
nations,” (i.e., Russia’s former colonies) along with the “oppressor nation” (i.e., the
former Russian Empire) into a unified, modern, socialist country had ever been
undertaken anywhere before, it had not been documented. In this sense, in order to more
carefully understand the rationale and process of such a project, it is worth appreciating
that Soviet leaders had little at their disposal in terms of lessons to draw from history at
that time.
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On the other hand, as postcolonial theorists Madina Tlostanova and Walter
Mignolo have criticized at length about the contradictions in Soviet anti-imperialist
discourse, the influence of Western European historical examples of modern empirebuilding is evident in the pervasiveness of teleological terms within which Soviet
narratives were often anchored, such as the condescending classification of some nations
as more or less “cultured” or “backwards” which accordingly required a more intrusive
administrative approach to the development of their national identities. Slezkine, for
example, points out the case of a number of “primitive tribes” in Siberia for whom a
special government was prescribed as a result of their widely dispersed settlements and
being “unable to run their own affairs.” 167 Such teleological narratives framing the
construction of national identities were particularly common and relatively unchallenged
during the early twentieth century in the United States and Europe; as postcolonial
scholars point out, Marx and Engels themselves invoked teleological ideas based on
Eurocentric constructions of certain stages of development that were a necessary process
towards a proletarian revolt against capitalism.168 To the credit of a number of Soviet
planners, as Hirsch notes, they noticed and questioned the “similarities between the
economic and political practices of the Soviet regime and those of other modernizing
empires.” 169 However, Lenin and Stalin’s determination to follow through with “nation-
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building” as a necessary step towards a “socialist union of denationalized peoples,”
proved impermeable to critiques from their contemporaries.170
Among the paradoxical results of this policy of nation-building as a transitional
stage towards “denationalization” is that the process itself reified concepts of national,
racial/ethnic, and linguistic difference. As Per Anders Rudling has shown, Soviet
anthropologists embraced the “science” of racial biology in order to help the Soviet state
fulfill its goal of constructing, mapping, and creating an inventory of official ethnic and
national identifiers, substantiated by scientific expertise.171 In this way, knowingly or not,
Soviet scientists in the 1920s collaborated with eugenicists harboring racist and social
Darwinist views, allowing them influential positions within a society which ostensibly
held its denunciation of racism and fascism as one of its founding principles.172 Given
that proponents of any one of a variety of fascist or xenophobic views have often invoked
eugenics in order to legitimatize their ideas regarding racial and ethnic hierarchical
classification,173 the role of racial biology and anthropology in the Soviet nation-building
project—or, as Hirsch aptly terms it, “state-sponsored evolutionism” 174—provokes
questions about what legacy it may have left behind in terms of concepts of scientifically
determined racial and ethnic identities, nationalist territorial claims, the entrenchment of
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ongoing tensions between nations and ethnic groups, and what kinds of narratives might
have become interwoven among all of these since then. Particularly in the aftermath of
the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the final abandonment of Lenin’s vision of
progressing towards the eventual transcendence above national, ethnic, and racial
differences, pursuing the question of what narratives and visions have emerged to fill this
rhetorical vacuum may reveal more insights regarding the Soviets’ role in identity
formation, even in post-Soviet landscapes.
Within this discussion of Soviet theoretical treatments of race and ethnicity and its
relationship to the formation of Soviet identities, another key dimension to include relates
to Soviets’ criticism of deeply ingrained racism observed in American society,
particularly towards African Americans.175 The vision of an egalitarian, international
unity of workers of diverse races and nationalities inspired Soviet leaders to welcome
African American citizens to live and work in the Soviet Union. In Blacks, Reds, and
Russians, linguist and scholar of Pan-African Studies, Joy Gleason Carew, examined the
biographies and discourse surrounding these experiences of African American émigrés
and visitors to the Soviet Union from early years to the late 1980s.176 The accounts she
shares in her monograph demonstrated that the Soviet Union offered opportunities to
establish lives, to contribute skills and be appreciated in a society that was apparently free
of the racial prejudice and violence that were a constant in daily life in America. For this
reason, many African Americans, including public figures such as W. E. DuBois and
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Langston Hughes drew upon their experiences in the Soviet Union in their defense of
Soviet socialism and in their criticism of America’s backward entrenchment in systemic
racism.177
At the same time, Carew’s study also demonstrates that African American
émigrés were not safe from Stalinist paranoia and brutality. Yet despite such stark
disappointments, she notes that even in light of the revelations of Stalinist terror, many
African American self-identified communists were less likely than their White
counterparts to abandon support for the Soviet Union, as they analyzed these revelations
in the context of the long history of racial oppression in the United States and within
Western European empires.178 As Carew quotes David Levering Lewis’s biography of
W.E.B. Du Bois: “‘To Du Bois, the degradation of the communist ideal in Soviet Russia
was philosophically irrelevant to the expiation of sins of American democracy.’” 179
Importantly, Carew also points out that a common criticism of Soviet camaraderie and
welcoming attitude towards African American émigrés is that it was a cynical
propagandizing tool to garner support for the spread of Communism and to undermine
the United States rather than a sincere desire to reach out across lines of racial and ethnic
difference. To be sure, such accusations are not completely unfounded given the Russian
Empire’s historical discrimination and violent oppression of non-Russian Orthodox
“others” (inarodtsy), the persistence of anti-Semitism throughout the Soviet period, and
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post-Soviet rekindling of xenophobia and racism, particularly in ultranationalist
circles.180
It is beyond the scope of this present research to evaluate arguments and evidence
concerning the sincerity of the Soviets’ welcoming gestures of camaraderie and goodwill
toward non-White émigrés and visitors. However, Carew’s monograph exemplifies the
value offered in taking notice of, and reflecting upon, the intersections of African
American experiences of racial attitudes in America and in the Soviet Union, as these
intertwined histories played important roles in the mutual production of both Soviet and
American identities.

The Second World War and Soviet national identity formation
Scholarship on Soviet history, as well as present-day Russian political discourse and
cultural practices, draw attention to the lasting importance and complexity of the role of
World War II in the formation and deeply affective internalization of Soviet identities.181
This identification with the Soviet past in the context of World War II has survived well
past the dissolution of the Soviet Union—not only as a patriotic Russian national identity,
but also as an enduring identity in formerly Soviet nations, now independent, as they
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contributed lives, land, and resources to the Red Army’s war effort.182 As Suny argues,
the years 1941 to 1945, during which the Soviet Union fought against Nazi invasion,
proved to be the most devastating of all tribulations experienced by the population during
the Soviet period.183
Whereas outside observers had assumed that the Soviet Union had not made
sufficient gains in industrial or military technological advancements to successfully resist
the Nazi onslaught,184 the mobilization and resilience of the Soviet population, with the
exception of particularly hostile states such as Estonia, proved stronger than Adolf
Hitler’s will to brutalize, conquer, and colonize the Soviet Union.185 The enduring
traumatic memories of an estimated total loss of twenty-seven million military and
civilian lives186—far surpassing the casualties of all other Allied or Axis forces in the
war—the siege and slow starvation of Leningrad’s population over the course of almost
two and a half years,187 economic losses amounting to approximately $128 billion,188 are
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all charged with ardent emotion even within most of the former Soviet countries outside
of Russia, as a testament to Soviet resilience and grit.189
As essential as it is to appreciate the role of the Second World War in the
formation of lasting Soviet identities among Russians and non-Russians alike, there is
also a need to question romanticized, homogeneous narratives of Soviet loyalty and unity.
For example, throughout a variety of accounts of the Soviet experience of the war,
scholars observe the not insignificant incidence of Soviet citizens, particularly in the
Baltics region, the Caucasus, as well as Ukraine, expressing disillusion or hostility
towards the Soviet government by supporting and even joining the invading Nazi
army.190 At the same time, the element of betrayal also worked in the opposite direction
as Stalin fostered an atmosphere of extreme paranoia among his security forces
exemplified by the arrest and, oftentimes, the execution of Soviet civilians and soldiers
who had been freed from Nazi imprisonment yet were suspected, often based on no
substantial evidence, of having collaborated with Nazi forces.191 In this sense, the
memories of the Second World War for survivors or for the families of those who were
victimized this way reflect a less heroic narrative of the Soviet Union’s role in the Second
World War and raises questions about the unanimity in how these shared experiences are
remembered as a factor in the formation of enduring Soviet identities.

189

Weiner, Making Sense of War.

190

Thurston, “Cauldrons of Loyalty and Betrayal.”

191

Ibid.

70

A final point to address in terms of the significance of World War II to the
formation of a Soviet identity and its corresponding narratives relates to the victory over
fascism as a rallying phrase that continues to echo through present-day tributes to Red
Army veterans and other contributors to the Soviet wartime effort, notably in presidential
speeches commemorating the Soviet war effort on Victory Day in May of each year.192
At face value, fascism—as an ideology that harbored xenophobic, anti-Semitic, social
Darwinist, imperialist views, and opposed the egalitarian values of Communism, even
while it opposed capitalism—stood in stark opposition to the Soviet Union’s
fundamentally emancipatory vision and socialist, anti-racist, anti-imperialist principles.193
However, a perplexing and dark irony of the Soviet role in World War II and Stalin’s
passionate rhetoric condemning fascism is that, as observers across a broad range of
literature agree, Stalin himself was known for expressing and enacting covertly and
overtly anti-Semitic and xenophobic attitudes and policies.194 As one example from the
early years of his leadership, the campaigns of political persecution known as the Great
Purges which took place during the mid- to late 1930s included a conspicuously large
proportion of Jewish victims.195 In his autobiography, Khrushchev admitted with remorse
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that he not only had knowledge of, but also participated in, the blacklisting and targeting
of Jewish citizens during Stalin’s leadership.196
To be sure, Stalin was not the first leader in Russian history to uphold such views,
as religious persecution and violent pogroms had been carried out since the early
centuries of tsarist Russia.197 However, the deep entrenchment of such attitudes within
Stalin’s policies and practices casts doubts on the strength of his supposed anti-fascist
convictions. As anti-Semitism and xenophobia throughout Soviet societies survived the
victory over fascism, the endurance of Soviet identities among current or former Jewish
citizens of post-Soviet states may carry a deep emotional charge, but perhaps not
necessarily a sense of total and egalitarian inclusion in Suny’s concept of the Soviet
affective community. In the present day, Russian officials invoke once again the rhetoric
of anti-fascism in relation to the ongoing tensions with Ukraine, based on evidence of the
steadily growing trend of ultra-nationalist, rightwing, fascist policies and sentiments in
Ukraine.198 However, Vladimir Putin’s Victory Day speeches in the past two years,
though they condemn the racism and xenophobia that fueled the worst atrocities of the
Second World War, and he acknowledges the multiethnic and multinational sacrifices to
the Red Army’s war effort, his discourse problematically avoids addressing the existence
of neo-fascist elements in Russia itself. For a nation that prides itself on its role in the

196

Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers.

197

Brook, The Jews of Khazaria; Jeffrey Veidlinger, Jewish Public Culture in the Late Russian Empire,
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009).
198

Per Anders Rudling, “The Return of the Ukrainian Far Right: The Case of VO Svoboda,” in Analyzing
Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text, Ruth Wodak and John E. Richardson, Eds., (New
York: Routledge, 2013), 228-255.

72

war, in which the Soviet Union suffered the most losses and destruction and played one
of the most decisive roles in ultimately defeating Nazi Germany, the reality of
xenophobia and fascism’s endurance in present-day Russia, threatening to gain greater
traction in Russian national identities—as exemplified by one of Putin’s most vocal and
popular political opponents, Alexei Navalny, whose xenophobia and ultra-nationalism is
well-known—carries troubling implications Laruelle 2014, 2018). 199

Dekulakization and Stalinist landscapes of social difference
Recalling the tight grip of tsarist authority over the population, particularly in terms of
sociospatial practices such as the passport system, the heavy scrutiny, and restrictions
placed upon non-Russian and non-Christian groups, the empire’s structurally and
physically violent policies are often cited in scholarship on Russian and Soviet history as
one of the main sources of overwhelming discontent among the population, eventually
boiling over into unrest, the momentum of which the Bolsheviks successfully harnessed
for the decisive coup d’état of the 1917 October Revolution.200 However, the widespread
discontent throughout the largely rural Russian population did not necessarily lead to
wholehearted support for the Bolsheviks who rose to power.201 Such ambivalence was
mutually shared between the peasant majority of Russia and the largely urban,

199

Marlène Laruelle, “Alexei Navalny and Challenges in Reconciling ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Liberalism,’”
Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(4), 2014: 276-297; Marlène Laruelle, “Conspiracy and Alternate History in Russia:
A Nationalist Equation for Success?” Russian Review, 71(4), 2012: 565-580; Laruelle, Russian
Nationalism.

200

Lynne Viola, The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and
Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

201

Ibid.

73

intellectually-oriented Bolsheviks who formed the new governing body. On this point,
the Bolsheviks had shared with other Russian intellectuals of various affiliations and
political persuasions the disdain and distrust towards peasant populations as backward,
irrational, and anachronistic obstacles to progress.202 Yet, as Sheila Fitzpatrick notes,
despite Bolshevik wariness towards the peasant class, the new government, under
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s leadership, understood the new nation’s crucial need to support
individual farmers who succeeded in producing high yields.203 In this way, the urban
Bolsheviks’ distrust of the peasantry was tempered with tolerance for the “pettybourgeois path” of kulaks or “rural capitalists.”204
As the consensus of historians of all stripes might attest, Stalin’s ascent to power
decidedly marked a break with Lenin’s tendency to compromise and meet kulaks
halfway. In this way, Stalin’s rule oversaw the production of a social landscape rife with
social difference and corresponding stigmas.205 One of the paradoxes of the Revolution
and the Soviet banner heralding the creation of a classless society, of harmony between
peasants and industrial workers, was the persistence and, in fact, a new deepening of
class-based difference and conflict between rural and urban populations. The difference
between the social stigmatization of peasants in the pre-revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods was that the broader society’s power balance appeared to undergo
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an inversion as the old tsarist order crumbled. At the same time, however, the fates of
farmers and their families began a regression to de facto serfdom.206 In the postrevolutionary period, this return to a second-class status in society was frequently
attached to the constant suspicion of being “an enemy of the people.”207 Against the pride
with which the Soviet Union branded itself as a bastion of social equality, peasants—the
vital class of food producers—became maligned in Bolshevik discourse as a symbol of
backwardness, conservatism, capitalist greed, counter-revolutionary dispositions—in
short, all the obstacles that the Revolution had sought to overcome in order to make way
for a future emancipated society.208
The stigmatization of peasants culminated in the persecution of millions of kulaks,
or farmers who, on the basis of often arbitrary reasons, were accused of keeping more
than their fair share of resources and wealth or were suspected of plotting a coup
d’état.209 Many of these peasants and their families were forcibly removed from their
homes and farms throughout the Soviet Union. They were then transported to “special
settlements” or forced labor camps, some of which were located within the Urals region,
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including what is present-day Chelyabinsk Oblast.210 At these camps, kulaks were to be
“rehabilitated” or—if deemed impossible to reform—executed.211 Either way, however,
many of those displaced succumbed to the severe living conditions at the labor camps
sooner than later. From 1930 to 1931, of the roughly 1.8 million kulaks deported to labor
camps for “rehabilitation,” 592,089 were deported from the Urals region.212 At the same
time, as Viola’s research indicates, many thousands of kulaks from throughout the Soviet
Union were deported to camps in the Urals. Although many of these displaced citizens
did not survive the experience, and a small number of survivors managed to return to
their places of origin—though most likely not to their own homes and lands—it is
possible that some of them remained in the regions, including the Urals, to which they
had been deported.213 The lands that were left behind as dekulakization took place were
generally either consolidated with other surrounding farms into collective farms,
kolkhozy, or converted to state farms, sovkhozy, to which poorer, landless peasants or
former kulaks were placed.214
Apart from the second-class status in which peasants were placed throughout this
process, particularly in terms of wages and compensation, their freedom to move to
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another location even temporarily was seriously limited as a result of the internal passport
system revived in 1932 after having been dismantled with the old tsarist regime in
1917.215 This system tightly controlled internal migration, as it had throughout much of
Russia’s tsarist era. In particular, at sites of special security concerns, such as the zone
selected for the construction of the PO Mayak complex, controlling the movement of
people rose to the top of the security agenda. Throughout the Soviet Union as a whole,
rural-to-urban migration became virtually impossible, restricting rural populations to their
assigned farms, further highlighting the parallels shared between serfdom before its
abolishment in 1861 and peasants under Bolshevik rule.216 Such evocations of the tsarist
days of serfdom in Soviet society renders rural subjectivity, the immobility of rural
subjects and their compulsory, permanent bond to rural landscapes as keys to
understanding the Soviet reiteration of social and spatial inequality before the Atomic
Age.

Breaking ground at Base 10: Establishing the construction zone for PO Mayak
Long before there materialized any amount of radionuclides of the kind associated with
by-products of plutonium processing, the construction of PO Mayak found itself in
conflict with the farming, fishing, and industrial communities situated in the north central
region of Cheliabinsk Oblast which Soviet planners selected as the place in which to
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construct the USSR’s first plutonium production plant.217 The leading planners of the
construction project, known as No. 859 and No. 817 for the two reactors to be built as
part of an integrated complex known as Base 10, had initially requested 1,159 hectares
(4.47 square miles).218 This total amount of land represents an aggregate of smaller
parcels to be transferred under formal agreement with the collective and state farms, as
well as city and village councils under whose jurisdiction these parcels of land were
located.219 A series of resolutions established by the Cheliabinsk Oblast executive
committee of labor deputies formalized the agreements under which such land transfers
were authorized. These agreements included provisions to compensate the collective and
state farms, other industrial operations such as timber mills and fisheries, as well as
residences, for the loss of land and properties, and included waivers of quotas for
production as well as monetary compensation for relocations.
However, the construction project’s planners began to flout agreements and the
established process of obtaining formal permissions for acquiring new land use rights.220
As Novoselov and Tolstikov’s account demonstrates, the construction team ultimately
took over 12,000 additional hectares (46.3 square miles) for its project, while barring the
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land’s rightful user, Kyshtym Metalworks, from entry, citing the exceptional urgency and
secrecy of the construction project.221 In the context of a country still reeling from the
widespread devastation of the War, the looming threat of atomic weaponry in the hands
of formidable enemies, there is weight in its case for urgency. On top of this, the leading
planners had not only the U.S. atomic capability to worry about in a more or less abstract
sense, but Stalin’s dwindling patience and increasing pressure to complete the
construction of PO Mayak and produce the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb.222
At the same time, however, in 1947, Chelyabinsk Oblast was only beginning to
stabilize its food supply.223 Up until November of 1947, food ration cards for urban
residents were still in use in order for them to purchase basic food and meals in dining
rooms, and many ordinary items such as fresh fruits were still considered rare luxuries,
out of reach to many.224 The population of Chelyabinsk Oblast, as in much of the Soviet
Union in those early postwar years still perched on the brink of malnutrition along with
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the health risks that accompany food insecurity and unsanitary living conditions.225
Therefore, taking any land out of production would necessarily translate into impacts that
would not be easily assimilated by producers and consumers. Official records from local
governing committees indicate that a significant portion of the land transferred or taken
by the construction project was considered arable and productive agricultural land. One
example of such cases of loss of access to productive land is found among archival
documents held at the United State Archives of Chelyabinsk oblast (OGAChO) which
include Resolution No. 18 by the Kuznetskiy District Executive Committee Council of
Workers’ Deputies, dated 26 May 1947.226 The resolution includes formal agreements
regarding partial transfers of land from the Red Ray, 1st of May, and Volunteer collective
farms, as well as a local timber mill and farming land reserve enterprise to Construction
No. 859 for temporary use. The three collective farms combined conceded to an
agreement to transfer a total of 1,294.45 hectares of land—approximately 5 square
miles—of land, which included a total of 826 hectares of land described as “arable.”227 In
this way, roughly sixty-four percent of the land transfer would result in a temporary loss
of access to arable land. The date at which the land would be returned to the collective
farms was not specified. Additionally, the third of four clauses, which outline a set of
actions to be executed upon passing the resolution, appears to anticipate aggressions from
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the construction project against farms, as it spells out the need to allow the Red Ray
collective farm to carry out agricultural work:
Send a request to the Chelyabinsk Oblast executive committee to issue an order
for Construction No. 859 to not impede Red Ray collective farm from carrying out
harvests and cultivation on 120 hectares of land that are wedged among the land
parcels within the project zone’s boundaries, but for which permission of use has
not currently been transferred.228
This particular order hints at the wide economic impact of the construction project’s
lawless land grab upon not only farm workers and factory workers whose livelihoods
depended on this land, but also local businesses and consumers who relied on their
products.229 For the workforce of collective and state farms, fisheries, and other industrial
enterprises, the impact of losing already meager income as a result of the unexpected and
sudden loss of access to their lands and work sites would have acutely felt. Apart from
the problems created by the construction project planners’ land grab, it also demonstrated
a certain corruption of power and the ease with which regulations and formal agreements
could be flouted by those who considered themselves authorized to do so, as the No. 859
and No. 817 construction project planners exploited the leverage they held even over
regional soviets (councils) not affiliated with the state security apparatus. In this way, this
event in Soviet history reflects a society defined by steep power inequalities which were
starkly manifested in conflicts over control of land.
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The creation of “a state within a state”: establishing the special security regime zone
As historians Novoselov and Tolstikov noted in their detailed accounting of the history of
PO Mayak and the closed security regime zone, the visit of the head of the NKVD,
Lavrenti Beria, to Base 10 to monitor progress of Construction No. 817 and 856
impressed upon him the need for drastic measures to ramp up security in order to render
it impenetrable to potential infiltrators, spies, and otherwise problematic elements, who
raised the risk of a sabotage of the Soviet atomic project.230 Such elements ostensibly
posed a direct threat to national security, for which reason Beria perceived the need to
establish a highly guarded “special regime” zone covering not only Base 10, but a buffer
zone of approximately 30 miles in all directions from Base 10.231
The Cheliabinsk oblast’ executive committee approved and implemented the
order on October 14, 1947, in addition to a draft defining the rights and responsibilities of
residents within the zone, a list detailing each of the 99 cities, towns, and villages to be
included within the zone, and tables displaying preliminary data about the populations
living within the regional districts the fell within the zone.232
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Establishing strict rules for residents of the special security regime zone
The list of rights and responsibilities repeatedly underscores the primary importance of
accounting for each resident age 16 and older rendering them trackable through the
mandatory system of passports and registration.233 The implementation of this system
meant that no one from the outside was permitted to enter even temporarily without
having a special permit issued and registering each entry and exit with local police.234 In
the same way, residents themselves were not allowed to leave the zone without officially
registering their exit with local authorities, with the exception of business trips lasting
thirty days or less to local institutions within the oblast.235 The only exception made for
the requirement to register at the beginning of a temporary stay in the zone applied to
leading oblast, district officials and Party-affiliated staff in leading positions who carried
certified documents of their business-related travel into the special security regime
zone.236 As the boundaries of the special security regime zone cut across landscapes that
included wooded areas rich with diverse flora and fauna, frequented by locals for
hunting, fishing, as well as foraging for various fruits, mushrooms and other sources of
nutrition growing in these areas, these activities were all explicitly forbidden to anyone
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not a resident of the special security regime zone.237 In quantitative terms, approximately
three percent of the total existing population within the zone was to be evicted and
relocated as far from the zone as possible. The two largest cities in the province,
Cheliabinsk and Magnitogorsk, were listed among the destinations which were
designated as being off-limits to evictees from the special security regime zone.
Additionally, the cities of Kyshtym, Ufalei, and Karabash were also explicitly noted in
the order as not permitted as possible places to which the evicted residents could relocate.
Such limitations would have posed potentially serious hardships for evicted residents by
limiting their options in seeking residence outside the special security regime zone,
thereby limiting their economic opportunities as cities such as Cheliabinsk and
Magnitogorsk would have offered the most opportunities and resources.
The holdings at OGAChO include official documents concerning the regional
implementation of Beria’s orders to establish a special security security regime zone
include tabulated data regarding the groups of residents deemed as security risks and
slated for eviction from the zone. Among these documents are included tables that tally
the numbers of evictees from each local district within the zone, and include tallies based
on age group categories (Under 16 years, 16-50 years, Over 50 years), social class
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categories (Manual Laborers, Non-manual employees, Collective farm workers, and
Other), and categories of individuals with criminal backgrounds or special legal status.238
This last table categorizes such individuals under the following headings: Convicted
under Article 58 of Criminal Code of the RSFSR (refers to political prisoners who were
found guilty of “counter-revolutionary” activity), Convicted under Article 59 of Criminal
Code of the RSFSR (refers to crimes considered “especially dangerous” to the Soviet
Union’s administrative order), Convicted for a felony, Repatriated, Special settler,
Former kulak, and Red Army soldiers taken as prisoners of war.239 A total of 1,161
individuals are tallied in this table, with the largest portion (24.5 percent) of individuals
categorized as “special settlers.”240

Deportation and exile: rural subjects as targets for social discipline
At approximately the same time in the summer of 1948, as the director of the NKVD as
well as security for the construction of PO Mayak, Lavrentiy Beria, established a special
security regime zone from which to evict certain residents, a broader scale program of
deportations was taking place throughout the Soviet Union. With particular relevance for
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the rural populations of the Southern Urals, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR issued the decree of 2 June 1948, titled “On exiling to remote regions those
individuals who deliberately avoid labor activity in agriculture at collective farms,
leading an anti-social, parasitic way of life.”241 The implementation of this decree
allowed for collective farms to accuse any given member of the collective of shirking
tasks and behaving as a “social parasite.”242 Members of the collective farm would then
cast votes on whether or not the accused individual should be deported, and based on the
results, the local village or district council held the final word on whether or not the
accused would be deported, and if so, where he or she would be deported to.243 As
specified in the title of the decree, individuals found guilty of this charge were deported
to collective farms or labor camps located deep in Siberia, Central Asia, or in the Far East
region of the Soviet Union. From these remote corners, the decree allowed deportees to
petition, after five years, to have the case reconsidered and be returned back to his or her
previous residence.244
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As historian Sheila Fitzpatrick notes, more than 33,000 citizens were deported
from their collective farms under this decree over the period of seven years from 1948 to
1953.245 Archival holdings in Cheliabinsk include petitions from collective farm workers
who were deported from the province in 1948, and requested to have their cases
reconsidered.246 Each petition invariably describes harsh conditions and ailing health as a
primary factory in making the case to be returned back home to their original collective
farm.247 In one case, a 1952 petition sent by a woman who had been deported to the
Irkutsk region in Siberia wrote of giving birth to a child while living on the new
collective farm, and described both her child’s and her own health deterioration as a
result of conditions on the farm.248 However, her petition was rejected on the basis of not
having yet reached the five year minimum of time served in exile.249 Other petitions
frequently mention situations of injustice in relation to the original accusation which led
to their deportations. For example, one deportee explains that the original accusation of
avoiding work at his collective farm did not take into consideration that he was a
decorated veteran who suffered debilitating injuries during the war, rendering him unable
to carry out some of the tasks he was assigned on the farm.250 Another petition from a
deported collective farm worker states that she was accused based on a personal grudge
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from the chair of the collective farm assembly, rather than her work history.251 Some of
these petitions succeeded in winning the case to be returned from exile while others
failed, but the petitions themselves all testify to the arbitrary nature of this program of
social discipline. For rural communities, such practices exacerbated the physically and
socially oppressive conditions of everyday life as depicted in these personal testimonies.
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Chapter IV: UN-ACCIDENTAL EXPOSURE AND THE PRODUCTION OF
CONTAMINATED SPACE
Knowledge about the effects of radioactive contamination upon living organisms has
covered vast ground since 1945 when anthropogenic sources of radioactive isotopes
developed for nuclear weaponry began to be emitted into the biosphere.252 When PO
Mayak began operation in the late 1940s, existing data relating to how anthropogenic
sources of radioactive isotopes affect the environment and living organisms were
relatively limited.253 Newer than the science which created the first atomic bomb,
radiation science in the context of health risks was still emerging in the early postwar
years as a new frontier in ecology and medicine.254 At the time, much of what was known
was either based on laboratory studies performed on non-human animals or on studies
using survivors of the atomic and hydrogen bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945.255 On top of the scarcity of data, the secrecy with which much of it was guarded
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in the U.S. posed another barrier in spite of the ease with which espionage circumvented
security measures.256 Yet the growing number of official and unofficial accounts of PO
Mayak’s history makes clear that by the time it began operation, scientific research had
established sufficient knowledge to justify greater caution than that which was applied
towards the potential collision between national security and public health in the
Southern Urals.257

Overview of the main biophysical pathways of radioactive contamination for Techa
River Valley residents
During the period of time when the most harmful levels of radiation exposure occurred in
the Southern Urals, the waste products of the plutonium production process at PO Mayak
formed the source of radiation.258 The literature covering the history of PO Mayak and its
contamination of surrounding landscapes makes note of the three interrelated ways in
which contamination occurred.
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First, the Techa River contamination involved the repeated release of radioactive
wastes directly into the Techa River, especially from 1949 to 1956.259 Second, the 1957
explosion, often referred to as “Kyshtym-57” for its proximity to the city of Kyshtym,
occurred as a result of a malfunctioning waste storage tank at PO Mayak which released
70-80 tons of radioactive material into the atmosphere and 20 million curies of
radioactivity. (For comparison, the 1986 Chernobyl accident released 50 million
curies.)260 Third, in 1967, the Lake Karachai reservoir system of radioactive waste
storage was the source of accidental release of windborne radioactive dust from the lake’s
dried lake beds in addition to the ongoing contamination of local wells as a result of
radioactive waste buried in Lake Karachai seeping through to the groundwater table.261
The practice of discarding mid- to high-level radioactive wastes in this natural lake had
developed as part of PO Mayak’s solution to eliminating the practice of releasing these
high radioactive materials into the Techa River.262
The first and mainly technical point to note about this set of three major
contamination pathways is that they arose from the large volume of highly radioactive
by-products necessarily created as part of the plutonium production process, as well as
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the complex and unprecedented engineering challenge of ensuring the safe management
of these highly volatile and radioactive substances.263 In addition, the question of how to
handle radioactive waste is further complicated by their longevity. For example, the most
common radionuclides which emit ionizing radiation in all of these cases are Strontium90, which has a half-life of 28.8 years, and 137-Cesium which has a half-life of 30.2
years.
The second point to note is that the far-reaching and long-term sociospatial
impacts shared by each these contamination events and processes and which contributed
to their interconnected complexity relates to their direct, life-changing consequences
upon numerous civilian populations whose rural and often subsistence-based lifestyles
had depended directly upon their surrounding natural resources which became
contaminated.264 As a result of their geographic locations and proximity to PO Mayak
and the downstream, downwind, and subterranean paths of radionuclides carried by river,
air, groundwater, and agricultural food products, many residents of villages and towns
faced debilitating health conditions, higher mortality rates, and social and economic
disruption, either as a result of evacuation and relocation or the sharply reduced access to
clean water and land.265
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The third point regarding these pathways of contamination takes on a broader,
more sociopolitical character in that state and institutional response to the resulting
health, social, and economic crises was complicated by a mandate of secrecy based on
the geopolitically defined priority of national security.266 As a result, for nearly forty
years, the vast majority of residents affected by contamination could not know the
underlying cause of their unusual health conditions or the real reason as to why contact
with the Techa River was prohibited or why evacuations and relocations were being
ordered for some communities but not others.

The Techa River contamination
Numerous historical accounts of PO Mayak’s repeated releases of radioactive wastes into
the Techa River make note of the social and political context within which these practices
took place.267 In particular, the United States’ show of deadly force using a new level of
military technology in August of 1945, devastating thousands of innocent civilians in a
matter of moments, drove home for the Soviet Union the concrete threat of an attack by
the United States.268 In this way, the post-World War II developments on the geopolitical
stage heightened the Soviet Union’s sense of urgency to build up its own nuclear
arsenal.269 Given the limited resources available as the Soviet Union struggled to recover
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from the economic devastation of defending itself from the Nazi invasion during the war,
these limited resources were singularly focused on uranium processing and plutonium
extraction, while the question of waste management was sidelined.270
To expedite the plan to build the Soviet Union’s own “nuclear shield,” Soviet
scientists and engineers relied heavily on information obtained via espionage within the
atomic program in the United States.271 In particular, historians note that the Hanford
Reservation served as an important model for the construction of PO Mayak.272 The use
of Hanford as a model is particularly significant in considering the practice of releasing
radioactive wastes into the Techa River as the Columbia River of Washington state was
used in a similar manner.273 However, the more shallow hydrography and slower
drainage rate of the Techa River watershed renders it much more vulnerable to
accumulating toxins than the Columbia River.274 Therefore, the total 2.75 million curies
(Ci) of radioactivity released into the Techa River from 1949 to 1956 had a greater
potential to linger undiluted and in close proximity to downstream villages and towns
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situated by the river.275 While scientists, historians, and observers agree that most of the
highly radioactive releases into the Techa River took place from 1949 to the end of 1951,
by that point, riverside populations had already been exposed to excessively high levels
of radiation and had begun to experience serious health problems.276 In total,
approximately 124,000 residents were exposed to radiation throughout the Techa River
watershed along approximately five hundred miles downstream from PO Mayak, and an
estimated 24,000 residents received a harmful dose of radiation.277

Kyshtym-57
In response to the health crisis created by the practice of releasing radioactive wastes into
the Techa River, PO Mayak authorities drew up plans to discontinue the release of highlevel radioactive substances into the river by finding alternatives to waste management.278
One of these waste management alternatives involved constructing underground tanks
which were designated to store the most highly radioactive and volatile waste. However,
as historian Kagarov points out, the equipment installed to regulate and monitor
conditions within the tanks failed, leading the dangerously high temperature spike in one
particular tank to go unnoticed by staff on September 29, 1957.279 The rising heat in this
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single tank reached a critical point on that date, resulting in an explosion that released
seventy to eighty tons of radioactive material containing twenty million curies of
radiation into the atmosphere.280
Kyshtym-57’s resulting fallout zone, also known as the East Ural Radioactive
Trace (EURT), was estimated as covering 23,000 square km (approximately 8,990 square
miles, or 2.5 times the area of Yellowstone National Park).281 Following the wind current
direction at the time, the EURT lies in a northeastern direction from PO Mayak and
continues well into Sverdlovsk and Tyumen provinces, both of which lie north and
northeast of Chelyabinsk Oblast. The resulting contamination is largely due to the
presence of Strontium-90.282 As Mironova et al. note, approximately 373,000 residents
were exposed to at least significant levels of radiation, including radionuclides carried by
multiple rivers and lakes that lie within the EURT.283 For the city of Ozyorsk, located just
north of PO Mayak, it is essentially only by chance that this town of about 100,000,
where PO Mayak workers and their families live, avoided the EURT, as the town lies
west of the fallout.284
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Lake Karachai reservoir system of radioactive waste storage
In addition to the construction of underground storage tanks intended to hold high-level
radioactive wastes after the disastrous consequence of releasing these into the Techa
River was discovered in 1951, PO Mayak authorities additionally designated a nearby
natural lake, Lake Karachai, as a reservoir to hold medium-level radioactive wastes.
Additionally, PO Mayak engineers constructed a system of additional reservoirs and
canals in order for Lake Karachai to be able to hold more volume of liquid waste, while
more efficiently diverting the more highly radioactive waste away from the Techa
River.285 Over time, the reservoir accumulated approximately 120 million curies of
radioactive material.286
In April of 1967, an unusually dry winter and early spring weather resulted in
very low water levels which exposed 45 hectares or about 111 acres of dry lakebed
covered in layers of radioactive sediments accumulated throughout almost twenty
years.287 As spring in the Southern Urals normally brings high winds, the dust from these
exposed lakebeds was lifted and across a similar northeastern path as the EURT. As a
result, approximately 600 curies of radioactive aerosols were dispersed and deposited by
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the wind over nearby villages, some of which had received evacuees from the previous
crises.288
An additional risk inherent in the use of Lake Karachai as a reservoir to hold
radioactive waste lay in the possibility of a flood event occurring with a dam failure,
which would then result in the flooding of Muslyumovo, the only town left in close
enough to PO Mayak to potentially be affected by such a flood.289 It was not until 2015
that PO Mayak completed the work of filling and paving over with concrete the last of
the Lake Karachai reservoirs in order to finally eliminate this risk.290
However, one last source of contamination in connection with Lake Karachai
which has still not been resolved relates to the groundwater contamination from the
radioactive material seeping from the lake bottom.291 Wells in local villages have been
found to contain contaminated water as a result.292

State and institutional policies and actions to protect the population
In 1951 Soviet state scientists began taking measurements of radioactivity levels in the
region surrounding PO Mayak and discovered that levels of radioactivity in soils and
organic tissues of animals were so high to the point of having become harmful sources of
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radiation.293 In June of that year, the Ministry of Health sent a brigade of scientists from
the Institute of Biophysics to conduct specialized medical examinations of riverside
residents.294 Their measurements of radioactivity showed that residents living closest to
site of discharge had received radiation doses which exceeded the safe level of radiation
for a human to receive over a lifetime.295 In September 1951, PO Mayak began
implementing changes in waste management to avoid releasing highly radioactive wastes
into the Techa River.296 This involved using the natural lake, Lake Karachai, as a
reservoir to hold medium- to high-level wastes, and constructing underground storage
tanks which were designated for the most highly radioactive wastes.297 From 1952 to
1956, state authorities began a program of evacuation and relocation whereby the villages
located closest downstream from PO Mayak were evacuated and relocated to villages
located further away from the river.298 In total, 17 villages were evacuated during from
1952 to 1960.299 However, subsequent re-testing and dosimetric readings showed that
high levels of radiation exposure continued to pose a health threat to riverside
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communities.300 Therefore, more villages downstream needed to be evacuated. For this
reason, by 1960, 20 more villages were evacuated.301 However, the town of Muslyumovo
and Brodokalmak, both of which have large Muslim populations, were not evacuated,
and questions about the reasons for leaving them in place linger in the present day.302

Water access and restrictions on the Techa River
In 1952, state authorities began to prohibit residents from swimming, fishing, or
irrigation using the Techa River water, but drinking the water was not prohibited until
1955.303 Such prohibitions were difficult to enforce in practice due to the lack of
alternatives for drinking water and other activities such as irrigation, swimming, and
fishing.304 While signs were posted, fencing was built along the riverbanks, and security
guards tried to discourage trespassing, neither residents nor the security guards were
informed of the reason why the water posed a health hazard.305 In an effort to provide a
safe alternative for drinking water, the government of Chelyabinsk Oblast ordered the
construction of wells for communities who remained in the Techa River Valley.306
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However, as the earth becomes hardened with frost during several months in the year, the
construction of these wells proceeded ineffectively.307 In addition, well water was known
for having a very poor taste in this region, which made the water from the Techa much
more favorable.308 In this way, residents habitually violated rules prohibiting the use of
the river water.309

Kyshtym-57: the “likvidatsiya” or, the clean-up crew
PO Mayak’s emergency response to the disaster included enlisting all available labor
sources to assist in the clean-up effort.310 Notably, those who received the highest dosage
of radiation included the individuals who were enlisted, with the help of local
government authorities, in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.311 As historical
accounts of this event point out, the clean-up labor force consisted not only of PO Mayak
workers but also soldiers, prisoners, students, and civilian residents of adjacent villages
including children.312 Moreover, the lack of safety gear specialized for protection from
radioactive contamination resulted in especially high dosage for this group.313 As
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historian Kate Brown points out, the clean-up workers drawn from soldiers, nearby prison
camps, and adjacent villages were the workers whose tasks involved the most risk of high
radiation exposure, while they were the least monitored for radiation dosage.314 The result
is that there remains insufficient documentation of how many people were enlisted in the
clean-up effort, what dosage of radiation they were exposed to, and what health impacts
they may have experienced as a result of their exposure.315
Contrary to PO Mayak’s official line regarding the number of fatalities resulting
from the disaster, asserting simply that there were no fatalities, eyewitness accounts as
well as archived testimony given by prisoners indicate otherwise.316 As many soldiers
were discharged after assisting with the clean-up, and prisoners were granted early
release, their medical conditions would not have been documented and monitored.317 As a
result, Brown points out, when PO Mayak asserts that Kyshtym-57 caused no fatalities,
they are basing this assertion solely on the medical records of their paid employees, while
the physical conditions of the vast majority of frontline clean-up crew were apparently
never officially recorded.318
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PO Mayak scientists mapped the EURT along with the varying levels of radiation
exposure within it in order to make decisions about evacuations and relocations. They
determined that any territory within the EURT found to be contaminated with an average
level of radioactivity exceeding 2 curies per km should not be inhabited by humans. A
total of about 11,000 people lived across this territory, but no evacuations took place until
at least one week after the explosion.319 As Mironova et al point out, some residents
waited for as long as two years to be evacuated and relocated.320

Lake Karachai: Flood risk and groundwater contamination
Following the April 1967 incident in which Lake Karachai’s dried lakebed and high
winds resulted in new radioactive contamination, PO Mayak engineers began to plan a
process by which Lake Karachai’s water level would be maintained by a system of
monitors and dams.321 In this way, its radioactive waste would no longer face the risk of
repeating windborne radioactive dust storm. However, with the construction of dams
containing Lake Karachai and its system of reservoirs, the risk of dam failure that could
result in a radioactive flood striking Muslyumovo existed until 2015.322 At this time,
Lake Karachai and its reservoirs were filled in with concrete, eliminating the risk of dam
failure and flooding. Unfortunately, this did not resolve the issue of groundwater
contamination as a result of radionuclides seeping through the lake bottom and migrating
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through rock layers to the groundwater from which local wells derive their water
supply.323 The discovery of this mode of contamination of drinking water was discovered
in 1973 and led to yet another set of evacuations and relocations for residents dependent
on these contaminated wells.324

Long-term social impacts of living in an irradiated landscape
Socioeconomic and demographic data for years between 1996 and 2003 show population
decrease across Chelyabinsk province.325 Most notably, in Kunashak district from 1986
to 2003 the birth rate decreased by nearly 50% while the mortality rate more than
doubled.326 Furthermore, of all the districts in which radioactive contamination from PO
Mayak occurred, Kunashak district saw the sharpest increase in the number of adults who
had fallen ill between 1995 and 2003.327 The increase cannot be explained by population
growth as the population of Kunashak district decreased across these years. Significantly,
Kunashak is the district which encompasses riverside territory that is adjacent to and
downstream from PO Mayak as well as territory that is within the fallout zone from both
Kyshtym-57 and the windborne radioactive dust carried from Lake Karachai’s dry
lakebeds in 1967.328 Therefore, its population has directly experienced all three pathways
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of contamination. At the same time, it is among the most economically vulnerable
districts as the population’s purchasing power is among the lowest in Chelyabinsk
province.329

The case of Kunashak district
Medical literature such as the many publications produced by preeminent Russian
medical researcher, A. V. Akleyev, also makes note of the exceptionally high rate of
alcoholism in Kunashak district.330 This fact is presented in his 2006 publication in which
Akleyev, along with a team of scientists, presented statistical accounts of demographic,
physical, socioeconomic, and psychological characteristics in relation to populations
impacted by radioactive contamination in the Techa River Valley. However, the
presentation of the pattern of alcoholism in Kunashak district in the midst of
demographic data showing a dying population, and appears to attempt to use the fact of
high rates of alcoholism as an explanatory factor for the outcome of high mortality and ill
health in this population.331 At the same time, the discussion of alcoholism omits
consideration of the district’s economic vulnerability or the geographic reality which has
historically placed this district in the direct path of all three major contamination events
originating at PO Mayak. This subtle discursive maneuver through data, its interpretation,
and how it is communicated to the public suggests yet another and less accidental
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victimization of marginalized populations living with contaminated bodies and
landscapes.

Thematic overview of “economy of secrets” and its historical impact on radioactive
contamination in the Southern Urals
In this overview of what I conceptualize as an “economy of secrets,” I will consider the
implications of the competing moral gravities that shaped the government’s response to
the public health and environmental crises caused by PO Mayak’s three major events of
radioactive contamination. In particular, I will focus on problems centered on the socialenvironmental inequalities manifested throughout the history of PO Mayak in
Chelyabinsk province. The first of these relates to the lack of transparency regarding the
destinies of rural populations which were evacuated as well as those not evacuated from
the most heavily polluted riverside villages following the discovery of severely high
levels of radioactive contamination of their surrounding land and their own bodies. What
explains the seemingly arbitrary decision to evacuate some villages but not others? On
these points, I make note of the suspicion some ethnic Tatar Russians have brought forth
in accusing the Soviet state of deliberately leaving the largely Muslim communities in
harm’s way while evacuating communities of which the majority were ethnic Russians.332
The second problem I will discuss relates to the lacunae and deceptive illusions deployed
by Soviet security officials as part of what I have termed the economy of secrets to hide
as well as disguise places, names, terms related to nuclear production or its after effects
as part of the effort to “throw the enemy off.” These practices carried out in the name of
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national security continue to muddle records that are vital for citizens’ own personal
documents with problematic results in the effort to make claims for government
compensation as victims of radiation exposure.333 Thirdly, I will discuss particular ways
in which such erasures and illusions manifested in historical records, with the effect of
hampering scientific research at the time, and present-day historical research.

Un-accidental exposure: Tatar and Bashkir citizens left in harm’s way
The prioritization of secrecy even in the realm of public health resulted in exposure of
rural communities along the Techa River to hazardous levels of radiation for a prolonged
period of years and even decades, in many cases. In the Soviet Union, those living in the
vicinity of PO Mayak were unaware of what the guarded complex produced or of the
extent of the health risks it posed. Adding to the perplexity of this drawn-out disaster,
researchers have noted that the majority of villagers who were evacuated during those
early years of the 1950s were ethnic Russian, while the majority of those who remained
were of Tatar and Bashkir ethnic descent, even as the rural areas surrounding Mayak are
predominantly Tatar and Bashkir.334 The town of Muslyumovo, for example, was one
such riverside community, located downstream from PO Mayak. According to Tatar
historian Faiza Bayuromvoa, in 2005 in Muslyumovo, 1 in 4 children suffered from a
congenital illness or condition.335 The lack of substantive explanation for state officials’
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decisions to not evacuate the residents, allowing them instead to stay put by the
contaminated river, without informing them of the contamination pervading their primary
source of water, has led to the belief that they were deliberately left behind as subjects of
research on the effects of radiation.336
Tatar activists such as Bayramova pursue this point further and accuse the state of
allowing such conditions with the intent of genocide against Tatar and Bashkir ethnic
groups.337 However, most of the current scholarly literature on the history of radioactive
contamination in the Techa River basin generally shares the consensus that while the
suspicion exists, there is insufficient evidence to prove deliberate ethnic bias.338
Additionally, among the documents I reviewed from the State Archives of Chelyabinsk
Oblast, covering records of the executive committee of Chelyabinsk Oblast, primarily
from 1946 to 1955, I encountered records from 1948, before PO Mayak even began
operations, pertaining to the resettlement of residents who did not qualify to remain in the
restricted zone around the territory on which PO Mayak was being constructed. These
records include the nationality of each head of household, among other social markers.
As in the case of Jewish citizens, Bashkir and Tatar citizens were labelled as such,
effectively othering them as distinct from the ethnic Russian nationality. Yet, I did not
find official documents reflecting explicit bias or aggressions against Tatar or Bashkir
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groups. One of the documents I reviewed, which outlined the committee’s plan to
eliminate an outbreak of cholera, included an order to produce educational materials in
Bashkir to distribute among Bashkir communities. Though minimal, this reflects an
official stance of inclusion in the domain of public health. However, as my review of
documents relating to multiple disease outbreaks during the late 1940s and 1950s shows,
the regional authorities of Chelyabinsk oblast repeatedly noted the lack of fulfillment of
plans to address epidemics and other health crises, reflecting the deep challenges of
turning plans typed out on paper into action and verifiable results. In this way, I do not
have a means of determining how this order to provide Bashkir language health education
materials played out in reality or whether or not this order was in fact carried out. Yet,
while there may not be sufficient evidence to substantiate such a claim, the fact that so
little information is made available to the public continues to fuel such burning questions,
resentment, and mistrust of the state. What is borne out by data produced by medical
research is that Tatar and Bashkir residents of this region disproportionately continue to
experience health effects of radiation exposure.339 Sociological research makes a strong
case for the role of historical and present socioeconomic marginalization of these rural
communities in exacerbating this continuing public health crisis.340
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The impact of erasures and illusions on the bureaucracy of compensation
On the issue of socioeconomic vulnerability compounded by illnesses and high mortality
rates as a result of the legacy of radiation exposure, the lack of transparency in records
regarding PO Mayak, its practices, as well as the special restricted zone created to secure
and hide it from the public compounds the challenges facing residents seeking to
establish their official status as victims of radiation exposure in order to qualify for
compensation from the government.341 As Nadezhda Kutepova and Olga Tsepilova
noted, residents of the special security regime zone during the Soviet period could not
display their actual place of residence on their official documents due to the fact that this
zone which included not only Ozyorsk but surrounding communities as well, could not
even be named in public at the time.342 Therefore, in the post-Soviet period, the fact that
such documents show a different place of residence for that time period, makes it all the
more difficult for an individual to prove they lived where they claim they lived during a
period of high radioactive contamination. Without evidence, their claims for
compensation, meager enough as it is, has no chance to be considered.343

The economy of secrets: erasures and illusions
The historians V. S. Tolstikov and Victor Nikolaevich Kuznetsov, who have written
numerous books and articles relating to the history of nuclear production and its socialenvironmental consequences in the Southern Urals, touch on the practice of using aliases
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and pseudo-terms for sensitive terminology, citing the 1949 establishment of the policy
titled “On the means of ensuring secrecy of facilities of the First Chief Directorate under
the USSR council of ministers.”344 As the authors note, this meant taking euphemisms to
an entirely new level to replace sensitive or red-flag-raising terms.345 In addition to the
nondescript pseudonyms of restricted cities such as Cheliabinsk-40 as an alias for the
restricted city of Ozyorsk, for example, a chemical element such as Uranium-238 became
Kremnil-1. Plutonium-239 became Ametil.346 Terms for serious medical conditions
related to radiation or biohazard exposure such as tsepnaya reaktsiya or “septic reaction”
became okisleniye or “oxidation”. Radioaktivnoye oblucheniye or “radioactive radiation”
became okurivaniye, roughly translated to “fumes.” Luchevaya bolyezniy or “radiation
sickness” became vegetososudistaya distoniya vtoroy stepeni, which I roughly translate
as “muscle spasms to the second degree.”347 In another example of euphemistic aliases
noted by researcher Susanne Bauer regarding the use of aliases to hide the real identities
of places, a radio-oncology clinic which treated cancer patients with radiation syndrome
in Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan was known as a brucellosis hospital named simply
“Dispensary No. 4.”348 In addition to such common use of aliases and euphemisms,
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Tolstikov and Kuznetsov note the overkill extent to which Soviet officials masked even
mundane things with no relation to sensitive projects.349 This policy not only rendered
historians’ tasks today that much more challenging and uncertain, but even Soviet
scientists pursuing research in radiation science at the time this policy was implemented
also expressed frustration with the obstacles it created in the circulation and vital practice
of peer-review.350
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CHAPTER V: SCIENTISTS AS SUBJECTS
Examining the role of scientists in knowledge production about the risk of radioactive
contamination, I incorporate within this study a personal dimension by bringing into
focus the biographies of scientists and their distinct situations as knowledge producers.
The importance of such an analysis of Soviet scientists as individual subjects lies in their
key roles as a restless community of knowledge producers in a society where not only
was this knowledge restricted to a privileged minority, but the access to such knowledge
served as the first step towards protection from the risks of radiation exposure. Therefore,
I disrupt the black box in which these scientists have been traditionally placed in
American and Western European historiography in order to reveal their lesser known
subjectivities and how these personal narratives helped shape the landscape of unknown
risk. In questioning the oversimplified portrayal of Soviet scientists, it is relevant to
highlight the especially privileged status of physicists, as their value to national security
objectives of nuclear weapons development allowed them much greater freedom and
access to state authority than that which was within reach of ecologists and biologists.351
This is particularly crucial to note as ecologists were among the first to raise concerns
regarding potential hazards of radiation in the environment.352 Relatedly, the shifts in
philosophical foundations underlying Soviet scientific reasoning across time, most
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notably after Stalin’s death in 1953, set off key disruptions in Soviet scientific theory and
practice governing knowledge production during the three decades following World War
II.353
As the nuclear arms race became a known and tangible reality at the time that the
United States dropped the first atomic bomb on a civilian population in Hiroshima, Japan
in 1945, it is relevant to consider American scientists in a discussion of scientists’
subjectivities in the context of the growing entanglement of science, society, public
health, and the environment in the atomic age. As Ethan Pollack notes in Stalin and the
Soviet Science Wars, Soviet scientists worked under the scrutiny of the state, facing
serious threats not only to their careers but also their lives if the implications of research
they produced strayed out of alignment with Stalin’s particular brand of scientific
Marxism.354 At the same time, nuclear physicists, by virtue of their key role in advancing
the Soviet Union towards the creation of its nuclear arsenal, benefited from a special
status which afforded them more intellectual independence than scientists in other
fields.355 In addition, the main rationale for restricting the public’s awareness about their
exposure to radiation and the health problems resulting from radiation exposure related to
what was perceived as a risk in the breach of national security.356
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Aleksandr Dmitrievich Sysoev, Physical Geographer
The career of geographer A.D. Sysoev merits inclusion in a discussion of scientists’
subjectivities in the context of the transformation of the Southern Urals into the Soviet
"nuclear shield" and in understanding the role of geography in the Soviet production of
space during the foundational years of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal in the Southern
Urals. Throughout the long and relentless course of Sysoev’s prolific career he organized
at least 34 scientific expeditions which played a key role in producing geographic and
environmental knowledge of the Southern Urals, including thousands of water bodies and
geologic features which had never before been measured, classified and rendered in
scientific terms.357 Significantly, in relation to the Soviet atomic project which
transformed the Southern Urals into one of the most important regions for research and
manufacturing for nuclear weaponry, Sysoev’s groundbreaking contributions to regional
geography of the Southern Urals served not only to guide later scientists’ research efforts,
but it also informed state planners.358 Yet, apart from the sheer magnitude of data, maps,
and geographical analyses he produced, from which later scientists, engineers, and
planners benefitted, Sysoev’s dedication to the unique landscapes, flora, and the myriad
of hydrological features within Chelyabinsk oblast also reflected his devotion and
reverence for such natural spaces. Over half a century’s worth of experience in forestry
served as his base from which he campaigned for the protection of regional forests and
natural resources, including the city forests of Chelyabinsk city, to which it owes its
beautiful, expansive parks and green downtown boulevards, allowing residents a literal
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“breather” from otherwise oppressive air pollution.359 In this way, a geographer
producing knowledge of the living spaces of the Southern Urals, making them legible to
state power and to the scientific method - as well as to his students and the public - also
aimed to convey these landscapes’ intrinsic worth and the need to protect them, both for
their own sake, and the sake of society.
The long span of Sysoev’s career illuminates his achievements as a geographer
and, in present-day terms, an environmentalist, who came to fully know the Southern
Urals region in not only textual but also tactile terms. In turn, he sought to freely share
this knowledge, along with his devotion to these landscapes, through numerous field
expeditions and his evident enthusiasm for sharing his own knowledge and experience
with students of all ages and without regard for social background.360 Such openness and
disregard for the boundaries of class, ego, or professional hierarchies stand in contrast to
the highly policed social hierarchies of scientific institutions ensconced in the militaryindustrial sites and (in)secure zones of the Southern Urals. In this way, locating Sysoev’s
subjectivity as a preeminent expert and key knowledge producer of space in such a
sensitive region of the Soviet state becomes a complex task that resists simplistic
reduction. This complexity reflects the unstable path which Sysoev, as well as his peers,
needed to perpetually negotiate in the effort to continue their pursuit of knowledge
without provoking the scrutiny and persecution of the Soviet security apparatus.
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In word and deed, the socialist revolution and its Marxist principles figured
centrally in Sysoev’s life, from his participation in mass strikes as a youth in 1912 which
led to his exile to a hard labor camp, to his service during the Civil War as well as the
Great Patriotic War, his unpretentious rapports with both peers and students, and his
attention to Marxist principles in Sysoev’s numerous writings.361 For example, anecdotes
from his friends and acquaintances note that he was known for sharing his food rations
with others during the war years, and once fell gravely ill as a result of giving his own
coat to a youth who was poorly dressed for harsh winter weather.362 While such selfsacrifice strays far beyond Marxist principles of equality, even in its most vulgar
caricature, it reflects Sysoev’s fidelity to the concept of camaraderie and his genuine
willingness give himself wholly to the common good, without regard for ego or
hierarchy.
In terms of his theoretical work in geography, one of his unpublished manuscripts,
for example, includes an essay devoted to outlining the achievements of Soviet socialist
physical and economic geography and developing his arguments for the global
importance of Soviet socialist principles in geography. Significantly, one of the main
points on which he based these arguments included stating that “Soviet geography,
standing as sentinel of the world, dispelled foreign geographic theories which proposed
laws on: 1) fertility rate changes, 2) overpopulation, 3) racial determinism in terms of
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human development, 4) environmental determinism.”363 Writing in 1955, Sysoev here
draws attention to serious points of controversy in Western geographic thought, one
which became a major source of criticism for implicitly excusing racist and imperialist
agendas, and eventually giving rise to the field of critical geography. In addition, it is
worth noting that during the early postwar years, many countries were, indeed, in the
midst of struggles for independence against the hegemony of European colonial powers
or in de facto colonial relationships with American companies.364 From the vantage point
of the twenty-first century, with the awareness of systemic inequality and injustice which
did exist throughout the Soviet years, and of which the case of the Techa River Valley
contamination serves as a prime example, it may be difficult to find sincerity in Sysoev’s
proclamation of Soviet geography as “sentinel of the world” against racism and
inequality. Yet, from the vantage point of 1955, it is possible to understand the
instrumental contributions of Soviet Marxist critiques of American and European
imperialist and capitalist exploitation towards the social movements against the particular
unjust world order that predominated at that point in the 20th century. In this way, one
can interpret Sysoev portrayal of Soviet geography as “sentinel of the world” as a sincere
assertion, rather than cynical lip service.
From a more personal perspective, Sysoev’s own family background provides
crucial insight into his affirmations of Soviet ideological virtues as he was born in 1890
in pre-Revolution Russia to such impoverished peasants that his mother saw no other
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option but to allow another family to adopt him as a young child.365 Having reached
adulthood knowing first-hand the stark social and economic inequalities and violence of
tsarist Russia Sysoev stood in a position which enabled him to deeply empathize with the
humanitarian needs which Soviet Marxist ideology purported to address. Such
experiences lend credibility to his words when he writes that the philosophy of Soviet
geography concerns itself with the “transformation of nature by productive labor, the
creation of a communist society.”366 This statement leaves little room to doubt that
Sysoev’s identity a scholar was fully invested in the Soviet project towards achieving
equality and justice. However, in this particular passage, how he understands that a
communist society is to be achieved is left more ambiguous. What role the
“transformation of nature by productive labor” plays in this process is not explicitly
defined. Yet in the same essay, Sysoev writes: “Through the years of Soviet rule, the
relationship between humans and nature, has defined itself in the possibility of humans’
influence upon nature, and in the same turn, the degree of nature’s influence upon human
society and its development.”367 This statement clarifies Sysoev’s position as
understanding humans and nature as parts of a single interactive process which plays an
especially key role in Soviet society and its development towards “the creation of a
communist society.” Such concepts reflect fundamental principles of Marxism, but in
relation to Sysoev’s legacy in Chelyabinsk oblast and the environmental and public
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health disasters which were unfolding during his most productive years, some questions
remain about how to reconcile these statements with the history of the atomic project and
radioactive contamination in the Southern Urals.
Did Sysoev at some point become aware of the highly secretive military operation
at PO Mayak’s facility and its impact upon the Techa River Valley and its communities?
If so, how did he reconcile the knowledge of this activity with his faith in the Soviet path
towards a communist society and his dedicated efforts to protect the unique landscapes
and natural resources of the Southern Urals?
Given Sysoev’s high-ranking status as a geographer and his highly productive
career in researching, mapping, and rendering knowable countless natural features and
spaces across Chelyabinsk oblast, it is difficult to imagine that throughout his numerous
field research expeditions and mapping projects he would not have stumbled across the
PO Mayak’s secretive territory or encountered individuals associated with it or learned of
it from one of his peers. As an example, in 1949, following a meteorite fall over territory
that included both Kunashak and Kasli districts on June 11th of that year, Sysoev led an
expedition to collect specimens of meteorite fragments which he later turned over to the
Meteorite Commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences.368 Being that both Kunashak
and Kasli districts were among those included in the special security regime zone, Sysoev
would have needed a special permit to lead this expedition. Such permits were only
granted by the state security apparatus to high-ranking individuals with special
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privileges.369 Even so, the trust afforded to such individuals also came with the threat of
severe punishment for betraying such trust.370 Yet, given his own rural and impoverished
origins, what may have been his reaction to the realization of the harmful risk posed by
PO Mayak to the surrounding population? Without a record of any kind on which to base
a reasoned hypothesis, one purely speculative possibility may be that Sysoev carefully
weighed the option of blowing the whistle on PO Mayak careless poisoning of innocent
civilians, which would lead to jeopardizing his life’s work, or to simply work even harder
to catalog and map all of the landscapes and features of the region and share them with as
many students as possible, giving future generations the tools and information with which
to carry on such work. It may be that of these two options, the latter appeared to be most
likely to successfully bring about the greater good.

Fyodor Yakovlevich Kirin, Economic Geographer
The complexity of Sysoev’s subjective position as a Soviet scientist and producer of
spatial knowledge is thrown into sharper relief in comparison with one of his
contemporary peers, Fyodor Yakovlevich Kirin, another preeminent and renowned
geographer of the Southern Urals who also carried out much of his research during the
same decades as the advancement of the Soviet nuclear arsenal at PO Mayak. Like
Sysoev, Kirin led a prolific career in teaching geography and producing numerous
groundbreaking works relating to theory as well as regional maps of Chelyabinsk
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oblast.371 In particular, he specialized in economic geography, and is known for
innovative approaches to methods and methodology in economic geography.372
Additionally, Kirin shared Sysoev’s enthusiastic embrace of Marxist-Leninist approaches
to philosophy and theory in Soviet geography, including the concern for society’s
responsibility in safeguarding the environment from anthropogenic damage as well as
other destructive factors. However, particular angles emphasized by Kirin in his work
regarding Soviet geography illuminates a tendency which sets him apart from Sysoev’s
unwavering egalitarian principles. In particular, in terms of Russia’s relationship to the
rest of the republics of which the Union was composed, an entire essay included in a
collection of manuscript drafts is devoted to making the case for the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSRSR) as being “first among equals.”373 While this
equality among the sixteen republics is embraced as the “friendship of Soviet nations,
establishing itself across almost four decades, following the harsh sacrifices of the Great
Patriotic War, emerges as the driving force of our progressive development on the path
towards communism," Kirin goes on to make clear that “the first place, according to its
own greatness, economic significance, [and] historical role belongs to RSFSR….” The
stark contradiction the two statements present to each other suggest a departure from
scientific rationality that is difficult to reconcile with the high reputation Kirin’s scholarly
endeavors had earned him. Particularly in terms of the first statement’s reference to the
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Great Patriotic War, which the Soviet Union is likely to have lost without the vital
resources and Red Army recruits from each of the sixteen Soviet republics, according to
literature on the history of World War II,374 Kirin’s quick dismissal of such contributions
in favor of Russia’s “own greatness,” amounts to an offense, all the more so in 1954, less
than a decade after the war’s end, at which time the entire Soviet population, throughout
all its republics, had barely begun recovering from its profound war wounds.375 In this
way, Kirin’s particular approach to framing matters of Soviet identity, ethnic identity,
and even history itself reflects nationalistic, a Russo-centric, nationalistic bias which
contradicts a fundamental Marxist-Leninist principle of class solidarity transcending
national, ethnic, or racial identity.376 As a result, such an approach lends itself to the
Soviet state security apparatus prioritizing national defense at the expense of local
marginalized communities, as in the case of PO Mayak in the Techa River Valley.

Producing knowledge of radiation safety
Historian of science Soraya de Chadarevian has argued for understanding the
advancement of genetics research in the mid to late twentieth century by conceptualizing
it in conjunction with geopolitical concerns and the acceleration of nuclear weapons
technology in the postwar era.377 The particular period of postwar scientific endeavors,
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taking heightened momentum during the 1950s, represents an era of paradigm shifts in
the geopolitics-science nexus. Concerns regarding security as well as intensified
ideological rivalries drove large-scale research efforts and advancements in genetics not
only in the Soviet Union and the United States, but also Great Britain. Significantly, the
tragic and long-lasting consequences experienced by victims of the atomic and hydrogen
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, as well as high-profile accidents
such as the October 10, 1957 Windscale fire and radioactive leak at a plutonium
production facility in Cumbria, Great Britain—exposing workers to severely and often
fatally high doses of radiation—spurred urgent questions to gain understanding of the
particular danger radiation posed for biological organisms and how to most effectively
keep such risks at bay.378
In the Soviet Union, the study of radiatsionnaia gigiena—literally, radiation
hygiene, but more accurately translated as radiation safety—became a top priority for
research in the early 1950s. Despite the sensitive and classified nature of much of the
research on which radiation safety was based, particularly during the late 1940s, the field
itself developed as a branch of public health and safety rather than as a matter of national
security.379 Research oriented towards radiation safety served to collect and analyze data
regarding the effects of ionizing radiation on health and the environment with the
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overarching aim of developing safety measures to protect the labor force, particularly
within nuclear industries, the general public, and the environment from the risk of harm
associated with radioactive exposure.380 Under the authority and policy direction of the
Ministry of Health, the research institutes corresponding to the Academy of Sciences
made significant contributions to building the knowledge base of radiation safety in the
Soviet Union. For example, the Institute for Occupational Safety and Disease, played a
key role in the establishing standard best practices and safety regulations for work
activities that involved working in close proximity to radioactive substances.381
The Institute of Experimental Medicine (IEM) operated as a branch of the
Academy of Medical Sciences (AMN) of the USSR which itself was subject to the
authority of Minzdrav—the Ministry of Health. Records of the IEM, held at the Central
State Archives of Scientific-Technical Documentation in St. Petersburg (TsGANTD-Spb)
include transcripts of meetings, conference proceedings, as well as official
correspondence which illustrate the emergence of radiation safety as a matter of urgency
not only for medical practitioners and the Ministry of Health, but also as a state
priority.382 These documents, particularly those from 1953 to 1959, provide snapshots of
researchers’ work lives as they orbited around labs. In the following section, I will first
draw from correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and outlines of annual research plans
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to follow their documentation of directions programmed by the Ministry of Health and
the Council of Ministries for the IEM’s research program as well as how IEM
researchers, including newly minted cadres of graduates in emerging fields, executed the
research goals with which they were tasked. In this way, these archival sources reflect the
regular administrative as well as scientific aspects of the IEM’s tasks in relation to its
contribution to the emerging field of radiation safety. Second, apart from demonstrating
many of the leading priorities guiding the research agenda of one of the key institutes
charged with building the science of radiation safety in the Soviet Union during the
1950s, these archival materials allow glimpses into the seemingly endless slough of
hindrances and stressors which hampered IEM researchers’ progress. In this way, I will
discuss the role of continuous lack of funding, resources, equipment, and adequately
trained personnel in slowing the pace at which the IEM and AMN as a whole could
contribute to the protection of the public from threats posed by radiation exposure.
Finally, I will focus the last part of this section on the laboratory animals that
frequently appear throughout these texts. As IEM researchers relied primarily on nonhuman animals as experimental research subjects, these animals played decisive roles in
shaping the course of research on a day-to-day basis. Laboratory animals both drove
breakthroughs that advanced the science of radiation safety and were often blamed for
disrupting the progress of work. While the question of ethical treatment lies outside the
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scope of this dissertation, the fact of animal agency in this process of knowledge
production warrants more than passing mention.383

Spetstematika at the Institute of Experimental Medicine
The term spetstematika was often employed to refer to the sensitive topics with which the
IEM was charged with researching. Spetstematika translates literally to “special themes,”
but in practice it more accurately referred to research topics which often included those
labelled as being of a classified nature, due to their close relationship with matters of
national security, such as nuclear weapons production and other types of weaponry being
developed during that period. Classified research topics included those relating to the
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of radiation illness syndrome as well as injuries and
other manifestations of disease associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. By 1953,
as nuclear technology had expanded in both military and civilian realms, such topics had
climbed to the top of the AMN’s research agenda. In the context of military and national
security, the concern over radiation illness and the treatment of injuries stemmed from the
threat of a nuclear attack from the United States striking both military personnel and
civilian populations. Such apprehension is rendered vividly in a letter dated 14 October
1955, from the head of the Department of Medical Radiology in the Ministry of Health of
the USSR, Evgenii Ivanovich Vorovyov, to Dmitriy Andreyevich Biryukov, Director of
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the IEM, listing a four-page list of recommendations to incorporate in the research plan
for the coming 1956-1957 academic year. As Vorovyov wrote,
The combined set of problems relating to injuries and illness associated with
atomic weapons in our time takes on special, important significance. Primary
attention in addressing this problem should be oriented towards scientific research
and practice, taking into account its relevance to defense and its critical
importance to life itself.384
The need to prepare to respond to potential injuries associated with nuclear explosions
resulting specifically from potential enemy attacks is made explicit in many of the list’s
items which included recommending research projects aiming to develop prophylaxis and
standard procedures specifically suited for treating “trauma to the face and jaw during an
atomic attack” 385 along with the special circumstances and conditions that manifest with
such injuries, and the development of “principles of first aid, triage, and evacuation
during an atomic attack.”

386

The unsettling and at times macabre reality of the nuclear

threat evinced in the painfully thorough list conveys the Soviets’ palpable fear of a
possible repetition of the United States display of power over Japan only ten years earlier.
As historian Michael Gordin notes, in the eyes of “many of these scientists, and for the
soldiers and bureaucrats who worked with them, the budding cold war was a continuation
of World War II (the Great Patriotic War, in Soviet parlance), and the American atomic
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bombers who threatened the homeland were no different from Hitler’s Wehrmacht.”

387

Therefore, one could “imagine them seeing an image of the ravished postblockade
Leningrad and projecting that to a nuclear-devastated Moscow.”

388

At the same time,

apart from aiming to meet the need to prepare for a possible nuclear attack, the Ministry
of Health’s recommendations for research regarding the evaluation, diagnosis, and
treatment of radiation illness and injuries would also have borne relevance to potential
accidents resulting from the Soviet state’s own military activities such as atomic bomb
tests which had begun in 1949.389
Apart from national security interests in nuclear technology, by 1955, the use of
nuclear fission for energy production had begun to expand all across the Soviet Union, its
accelerating growth proceeding in full momentum. Moreover, in medical practice and
other public health realms such as food safety, the use of radioisotopes followed suit, as
scientists strove to develop innovative solutions to the widespread public health
challenges which still trammeled the Soviet Union’s postwar recovery in 1955. Such
efforts are exemplified in the Ministry of Health’s Decree № 49s of 2 September 1958
which emphasized forging paths towards the expanding civilian uses of radioisotopes to
serve the broader goals of advancing medicine, public health and safety, and energy
production. For the Ministry of Health, the particular ambitions inspired by the potential
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benefits of harnessing nuclear technology for advances in medicine are reflected in its
order to the Presidium of the AMN as well as each of the Soviet republics’ own
ministries of health to bring to fruition scientific research projects pursuing the
incorporation of radioisotopes and radiation in the following areas in 1959:
“….biochemistry, physiology, pharmacology, microbiology, industrial toxicology,
diagnostics and medical treatment of various illnesses, for cold sterilization of
medication, serum, vaccines and antibiotics and biological synthesis of noted
pharmaceutical drugs and compounds.” 390
Correspondingly, however, along with the expansion of nuclear technology
throughout civilian industries, the incidence of workplace mishaps and injuries also
multiplied, while the standards for responding to such events had not yet kept pace. In
this way, these broader trends in the realm of the nuclear industry contributed to the
heightened importance of research on radiation safety. This included the accelerating
expansion of nuclear technology for civilian use, including energy production, as well as
the use of radioisotopes in medical practice. Responding to the need to establish more
robust institutional infrastructure to protect the public from the host of hazards being
ushered into the wider population by increasingly ubiquitous radioisotopes, the Ministry
of Health ordered, by Decree № 41 of 1 January 1958, the creation of radiologicheskiye
grupy—in English, radiological groups.391 Recently published research by historian
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Laura Sembritzki, whose meticulous sleuthing through scores of archival materials, much
of which had not been utilized previously, has provided illuminating portraits of the legal
contexts and bureaucratic honeycomb comprising the institutions charged with protecting
the public from rogue radiation.392 As she notes, radiological groups, serving under the
authority of the Ministry of Health, were incorporated into the system of sanitarnoepidemiologicheskie stantsii, or sanitary epidemiological stations (SES), which already
existed as part of the Ministry of Health’s public health monitoring network throughout
the Soviet Union.393 In this capacity, radiological groups were responsible for the
“preventive oversight of all industries, laboratories, and research institutions that applied
radioactive materials or sources of ionizing radiation” from the standpoint of protecting
public health and safety. 394
In the context of treating radiation illness and injuries associated with radiation
exposure, the IEM’s research program during this time typically included investigative
and experimental projects focusing on developing means of evaluating, diagnosing, and
treating the impacts of ionizing radiation on animal organisms’ immune system,
infectious diseases, neurology, blood and vascular system, digestive system, as well as
trauma such as wounds and burns. For example, at a meeting on 8 February 1954, senior
researcher V. B. Isachenko presented preliminary results on experimental research using
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a radiation illness treatment referred to as Preparat 88.395 Isachenko’s results showed that
Preparat 88 decreased the mortality of mice with radiation illness from 100% to 45%.396
Responding to a question about the potential to administer Preparat № 88 to people with
radiation illness, Isachenko responded, “Preparat 88 works as a hypotension agent, and
its use as treatment for humans is allowed, however for radiation illness it should be
administered in large doses. The treatment is permitted to be administered to people, but
it is not used for radiation illness there.”

397

The transcript of the meeting does not

provide any context to help identify the location to which “there” refers. However, at the
meeting’s conclusion, Isachenko’s presentation and the positive response it received at
the meeting resulted in adding to the list of action items an order for the Department of
Pharmacology at the IEM to pursue the question about gaining permission to use
Preparat 88 for the treatment of radiation illness in humans.398
In addition to concerns regarding radiation illness and injuries, the IEM’s research
agendas during this postwar period overlapped with health risks emerging in conjunction
with the development of a diverse repertoire of sophisticated chemical and biological
weaponry not directly related to nuclear arsenals, as well as industrial and agricultural
applications for such developments in chemical manufacturing. Research project plans
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from 1959 demonstrate focused attention on the development of antidotes for toxic
exposures to organophosphorus compounds, which are used as insecticides as well as
nerve agents, and pose lethally toxic threats to humans. The somewhat cryptic category
label created for this particular topic, Problema № 40a, conveys the critical importance
of the laboratory research it encompassed as an issue of both military and civilian
concern. An official letter dated 24 September 1959, from the director of the Institute of
Toxicology, Sergey Nikolaevich Golikov, to the director of the IEM, D. A. Biryukov,
lists recommendations for research projects to incorporate into the plan for the following
year, all of which center on “Problema № 40а, ‘Toxicology and Anti-Chemical
Protection.’”399 These recommendations include investigating the pathogenesis of
conditions caused by “chemical agents of mass destruction upon humans” along with
developing standard clinical procedures to treat such conditions, the “mechanism of
detoxification from organophosphorus compound poisoning in organisms,” establishing
“permissible concentrations of gaseous organophosphorus compounds,” and streamlining
methods of “removing mustard gas and organophosphorus compounds from food
products.”

400

Golikov’s additional comments regarding these recommendations provide

further insight into the significance Problema 40a carried not only in terms of strictly
military concerns but also in broader, quotidian arenas of civilian life as well:
Considering the wide use of organophosphorus agents in industry, agriculture, and
medicine,… there arises the need to study not only extreme degrees of toxicity,
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but also slight levels of toxicity. Research would preferably be carried out using a
variety of animal species, as well as to define the earliest indicators of toxicity
with which to establish the detection of biological indicators for weak levels of
poisoning. Laboratory experiments need to correspond to clinical data, obtained
from cases of patients treated for toxicity from organophosphorus insecticides,
and with safety data, relating to work conditions…401

Golikov here draws attention to the extent to which such toxic substances as
organophosphorus compounds were pervading mundane, civilian activities and places,
and his mention of past cases of patients treated in clinical settings for toxic exposure to
these substances demonstrates that, as in the case of radiation exposure, unintended
mishaps were already occurring while the expertise needed to properly respond and
prevent such occurrences had not yet caught up.
In the context of the military’s direct interest in the IEM’s research on toxicology
of new chemical and biological agents, the IEM duly sent periodic reviews written by its
established scientists to the S. M. Kirov Military-Medical Academy regarding current
dissertation research produced by the IEM’s doctoral students. In 1959, several such
reviews were written regarding research centered on developing antidotes and other
treatments

specifically

for

the

purpose

of

counteracting

toxic

exposure

to

organophosphorus substances. One particularly favorably reviewed dissertation
investigating comparative pharmacological and therapeutic characteristics of tropine
compounds introduced the topic as a timely and important contribution to the search for
substances capable of more precisely controlled effects, such as antidotes for
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organophosphorus substances, a problem pursued by “many pharmacological and
toxicological laboratories throughout the country and abroad” at that time.402
dissertation,

titled

Comparative

Pharmacological

and

This

Pharmacotherapeutic

Characterics of Selected Tropine Compounds, by V. G. Ovakimov, included in the
discussion of applicability of the research findings to the development of effective
antidotes for toxicity from nerve gas such as sarin and soman.403 Another dissertation
review sent to the S. M. Kirov Military-Medical Academy from 1959, titled Development
of Antidotes for toxic organophosphate substances for simplified human application, by
N. V. Savateev, underscores the significance of the work for ensuring the safety of the
antidote substances studied, by noting that the work was first tested on animals and then
upon human volunteers, including the dissertation author himself, and finally on soldiers
undergoing combat training.404
The sensitive nature of the research projects undertaken at the IEM may explain
the ongoing existence of restrictions placed on certain topics, not only those relating to
radiation illness, but also many other topics that were emerging on the horizon of midcentury military technologies, such as chemical and biological warfare. The concern for
restricting the flow of information related possibly not only to precautions taken
regarding national security and restricting defense-related information from espionage,
but also to the fact of the sensitivity of such information and its potential for widespread
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harm if accessible to both foreign and domestic parties with ill intentions. Accordingly,
the administrators of the IEM followed directives to restrict certain matters by
categorizing them as spetstematika, some of which carried the label sekretno, meaning
“classified,” or using cryptic titles to categorize certain themes. Research topics relating
to radiation illness and injuries, for instance, were often referred to as Problema № 19
throughout official correspondence, research project plans and summaries, and transcripts
of meetings. The institutionalization of secrecy intensified at the IEM in 1953, as a
meeting of leading researchers and administrators on 4 September of that year convened
to announce decisions they had reached regarding the sensitivity of IEM research projects
they had reviewed in the context of state secrecy. The review led to ordering the
retroactive designation of numerous research projects that had already been conducted in
1951, 1952, and in the preceding months of 1953 as “classified” material. While the
projects’ publications and data were in effect not actually classified as they had already
become accessible, applying “classified” label served the purpose of guiding the process
of determining whether or not future projects should be considered restricted from open
access due to their overlap with matters of state secrecy. In particular, research projects
focused on diagnoses and treatments of malignant growths as well as “the study of the
impacts of radiation upon organisms” were to be considered restricted and would bear the
sekretno label. The decision announced at this meeting in 1953 suggests that the issue of
radiation illness itself should be considered the determining factor in designating a given
project as “classified.” Indeed, official correspondence from the Vice President of the
AMN at that time, F. G. Krotkov, to the IEM director, D. A. Biryukov, outlining the
research projects for the IEM to take on for the second half of 1954 further confirm this,
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while illuminating nuances regarding the specific research topics that set apart classified
from unclassified material.405 While Krotkov labelled as “unclassified” two planned
research projects regarding the damaging influence of radiation upon the circulatory and
respiratory systems and experimental lesions, a research project described as focusing on
prophylactic treatment of radiation illness was labelled as “classified.” 406 In any case, the
letter conveys as sense of urgency and appreciation for the crucially importance of the
topic of radiation illness, as Krotkov urges Biryukov to “take all measures within your
authority to ensure the timely completion of the attached plan,” given the “special
importance and timeliness of radiation illness.” 407
It also is worth considering other concerns beyond the question of national
security which could account for the attention to restricting certain types of research
matters. One such concern relates to the issue of intellectual property claims. This
concern is alluded to during a presentation of ongoing research projects at the IEM in
1959. Specifically, the presentation by researcher Vera Ivanovna Ilienko of the
Department of Virology, regarding research focused on improving methods of diagnosing
and identifying pathogens causing viral infections affecting the nervous system, with
particular attention to tick-borne encephalitis, concludes with an exchange with IEM
director and chair of the meeting, D. A. Biryukov, and head of Microbiology, Professor
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V. I. Ioffe regarding the question of whether or not it should be considered a “closed”
topic:
Ilienko: In this part of the research, which is completed, there is no classified
information, and it does not need to be closed. At this time there is a lot of
research being carried out on tissue cultures.
Chair [Biryukov]: Why do you think that this does not need to be a closed
topic?
Ilienko: This topic has been carried out widely—among us and abroad.
Abroad there have not been any publications on dosages, but logically there must
be about ten thousand working on this. I already reported on our results in
Mikrobiologicheskoe Obshchestvo [journal] (though it’s true that I did not discuss
quantities), and I posed the issue in a somewhat different way. Ten thousand—
this is naturally in the pursuit of improving methods, and everyone is striving for
this same goal, so there is nothing to restrict here.
Prof. Ioffe: I am not familiar with the literature on this issue—are there in
the literature any comparable data regarding the use of suspended cells from
chickens’ embryonic fluid? Are there quantitative data regarding discrepancies or
not? If in open literature you did not find this, then for now I would keep this
material closed. I agree that other researchers might arrive at this data on their
own, and I am not even sure that it hasn’t already been done. Maybe someone else
already achieved this—not among us, but abroad—but we don't know that.
This research is interesting, and if restricting access to it does not delay
your work, I would consider it restricted.
Ilienko: People want to get diagnostic data sooner, they come to us from
the periphery, they consult with us regarding our methods. Our methodology
already became the property of many, and it’s already out there.
Chair [Biryukov]: We need to consult with higher authorities somehow
regarding this question. I will, for now, insist on staying quiet about it.408

The exchange hints at a variety of concerns that typically continue to influence
researchers to this day regarding intellectual property claims and the need to keep in-
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progress research protected until it is published or ready to be published. As Professor
Ioffe’s comment suggests, his main concern appears to stem from possible risks in terms
of the project’s vulnerability to criticism on the one hand, as well as plagiarism on the
other hand, due to its methodological originality and divergence from what is established
in existing literature, at least that which has been published “among us,” within the Soviet
Union. However, Ilienko’s insistence on the de facto open accessibility of the topic,
particularly in terms of the sheer multitudes whom she assumes are already applying
similar or even identical methods in the use of tissue cultures for research aimed at
improving and speeding up the diagnosis of viral diseases such as tick-borne encephalitis,
suggests that she did not perceive any benefit to the project or even to the broader field
by imposing any restrictions on its accessibility. To the contrary, by suggesting that the
dissemination of information such as “diagnostic data” was excessively slow and so
burdened by restrictions that many other researchers—perhaps even “ten thousand”—
were already applying such methods and laying claim to findings obtained using them,
Ilienko hints at a sense of frustration with unnecessary impediments placed in the path of
advancing science and the crucial need to circulate innovative breakthroughs.
Additionally, by pointing out that so pressing was the need for such data, even
outside the elite urban hubs of scientific research, that she and her team were being
approached “from the periphery,” perhaps by researchers or even medical practitioners
working in areas throughout the country, beyond Moscow and Leningrad, overwhelmed
by public health dilemmas caused by outbreaks of viral diseases, such as tick-borne
encephalitis, that to impose restrictions would be counterproductive to the larger goal of
serving the interests of public health. Ultimately, however, Biryukov invoked the need to
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err on the side of silence and toe the line drawn by “higher authorities,” thereby settling
the matter.
Archival records of the IEM’s official correspondence, meeting minutes and
transcripts, and reports are peppered with laments, rebukes, along with other expressions
of disappointment and even alarm regarding what was often described as slow progress
or even the absence of any work being done at all to meet the tasks required of the
institutes. For example, the transcript of a meeting of IEM researchers discussing
progress of current work and the planned research program for the 1953-1954 term on 13
October 1953 IEM reveals frustration at the lack of enthusiasm among scientists for
following through with radiation illness research which had been highlighted as an issue
of top priority by the Ministry of Public Health. Among the concluding statements and
warnings against further foot-dragging is the following comment by the head of
radiology, Professor Pobedinsky:
Topics of radiation illness are being developed by decree of the Council of
Ministries; removing any topic requires special permission. The state provides
plenty of resources and staff; we have to overcome this dismissive attitude toward
this work. The research plan of the IEM carries over into 1954. Any expansion to
the program will not go through, but omitting any part of the plan will also not be
allowed.” 409
Pobedinsky’s admonition allows a more close-up glimpse of the extent to which the grip
of higher Soviet state authorities permeated the day-to-day business of producing
research at the IEM, as he underscores the pressure from above—along with relatively
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generous funding—and the tight leash by which the Council of Ministries exercised
control over research institutes. Therefore, the lackluster performance may have been the
passive manifestation of resentment that such stifling micromanagement and intellectual
rigidity likely stirred for both new and veteran researchers at the prestigious institute,
regardless of how they might have perceived the urgency of radiation illness and their
own critical role in developing protective measures and treatments against it.
Apart from the lack of flexibility and independence regarding the topics IEM
researchers could choose to pursue, the practical challenges of taking on serious research
questions regarding a relatively new field which required highly specialized and often
prohibitively expensive equipment that could not be easily repaired when inevitable
breakdowns occurred also posed continuous hurdles for research endeavors. As
Physiology Department researcher N. I. Arinchin, at the same closed meeting in 1953,
concluded his research progress report regarding the impacts of ionizing radiation on
blood cell production in dogs, he mused, “One must approach the question of radiation
illness with complexity; this is why the work in this field is so difficult.” 410 Perhaps not
surprisingly, Arinchin’s appreciation of the complex nature of radiation illness along with
the need to approach it with caution in research earned him direct rebuke from Biryukov
at a follow-up meeting four months later in February 1954. Following Arinchin’s
progress report regarding his research, and specifically in response to the reported delay
in starting the experimental phase involving the application of radiation as a result of
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changes implemented in the methodological approach, Biryukov dismissed the
significance of Arinchin’s preoccupation with research methods while he drove home the
exigency of “getting results” and “picking up the pace towards the study’s special task:
the impacts of radiation.” 411
Biryukov’s inability to hide his exasperation with the pace of progress of radiation
illness research at the IEM can at least in part be interpreted as a reflection of the intense
pressure exerted from the institutions perched above him in the chain of command. In
Decree № 90 of the Presidium of the AMN, the Academy presents its response to a report
by the AMN’s Vice President, F. G. Krotkov, which found that all twelve institutes
within the Academy were failing to meet the research goals prescribed by the Ministry of
Health regarding Problema № 19—radiation illness. The decree notes that the Presidium
itself, along with each of the twelve institutes’ directors, bore responsibility for this
failure resulting from their “underestimation…of the important, state significance of
Problema № 19 and the complex problems it comprises.”412
Significantly, the decree also demonstrates the Presidium’s recognition of its own
shortcomings in efficiently administering the necessary funds, resources, and recruitment
of adequately trained personnel to enable each of the institutes to pursue their assigned
research plans. In particular, as decree notes, as a result of the Presidium’s poor
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administration of resources, the institutes lacked the “proper facilities to be used for
irradiation of experimental animals, specialized apparatuses, protective gear (lead), and
fund allotment for the procurement of experimental animals.”413 The guiltiest culprit
appeared to be the Academic Council formed especially to work on Problemа № 19, by
resolution of the Presidium of the AMN on 4 November 1953, as “it literally did not do
any work (only one meeting was convened, chaired by the academic Anichkov.”

414

Additionally, the IEM was highlighted as one of the four institutes, along with Virology,
Pediatrics, and Pathophysiology & Experimental Therapy, which were proceeding in
such a way that raised serious alarm at the AMN.415
Much is often made of the especially generous funding made available to elite
research institutes, particularly those working on issues relevant to highly sensitive topics
that bore close relevance to the state’s national defense interests. In this decree, the
Presidium pointed out that despite the disbursement of 1,840,000 rubles to fund the
procurement of special equipment and recruitment of personnel, the research plan on
Problema № 19 still found itself in jeopardy. In this way, a disconnect emerges into view
between the financial management of state resources and their intended implementation.
Additionally, a handwritten note, apparently written by IEM director D. A. Biryukov, to
whom this copy of the decree was addressed, circled a statement regarding the 12 newly
recruited personnel that were to be funded by the IEM’s share of the fund allotment.
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Biryukov’s note refuted that number: “We need to inform them that we don’t have twelve
[new personnel].”416 In this way, it becomes more and more clear that the apparent wealth
of these elite research institutes as indicated by documents did not always reflect reality,
but more accurately reflect their vulnerability, being at the mercy of the incompetence of
authorities to which they were subject.
The problem of chronic shortages and entirely unavailable specialized equipment
necessary for any work entailing the use of ionizing radiation posed ongoing, material
impediments to the IEM, particularly in terms of advancing at a pace that would have
satisfied the watchful eye of state bureaucracy. In an early example from October 1953,
Biryukov concluded his progress report on the multi-project research plan assigned to the
IEM, by highlighting the practical obstacles posed for moving forward with the
experimental tasks involving the application of ionizing radiation on non-human animals:
“Due to the lack of specially-equipped rooms, equipment, and personnel, the Institute has
so far not begun the second and third projects—those involving isotopes—in the research
plan.”417 Underscoring the IEM’s protracted struggles to obtain the necessary provisions
to carry out their assigned research plan, Biryukov recounted his repeated requests to the
department of radiology at the Ministry of Health, specifically for highly specialized
devices used for the application of ionizing radiation upon laboratory animals serving as
research subjects, and the specially trained staff needed to correctly operate such
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equipment and successfully carry out experimental tasks. Exemplifying the high cost of
the technology necessary for the study of radiation illness, Biryukov budgetary list
included requests for 4,000 rubles to purchase two dosimeters and 30,000 rubles for
irradiating devices.418 As the IEM’s archival records from 1953-1959 demonstrate, such
requests were continuously repeated and just as often went unanswered, creating a
feedback loop where lack of necessary resources and staff resulted in failures to fulfill
research plans on time, which would further invite close scrutiny and reluctant allotments
of funds from the Ministry of Health.
In spite of the relative prestige and elite status of research institutes such as the
IEM, and the high state significance of the spetstematika research with which they were
tasked, the funds allotted did not ensure that they would have access to the newest
technology. Therefore, while experiments involving the irradiation of laboratory animals
formed a major component of the IEM research plans, in 1954 they had not received from
the Ministry of Health the complete research funding they had requested, forcing the
institute to accept from the Roentgenological Institute old x-ray devices which were
deemed “quite suitable for radiating animals.”
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Apart from the scarcity of specialized

equipment needed to conduct experiments involving the application of ionizing radiation,
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scientists regularly tell of shortages of relatively inexpensive and commonplace
laboratory tools such as pipettes as this was repeatedly cited as an additional setback
slowing down progress in a given project.
As much of the literature regarding the history of nuclear technology in the Soviet
Union points out, scientists and laboratory technicians were faced with such chronic
shortages in both the bare essentials of safety gear such as rubber gloves and more
sophisticated equipment such as dosimeters were experienced more often than not.420
Yet, scarce funding counts as only one factor among others in creating safety hazards, as
Sembritzki points out, such as the frequent violations of safety regulations, even among
radiological group personnel, and the overall dysfunctional system of radiation safety
monitoring and enforcement.421 At the same time, despite the challenges faced, the
growth and expansion of nuclear science at research institutes and academic institutions,
created opportunities for deeper interdisciplinary cooperation and dialogue between
otherwise compartmentalized fields. Taking note of this at a meeting convened by
multiple institutes to discuss research progress on Problema № 19, the director of the
Roentgenological Institute, M. N. Pobedinskiy, advocated for the beneficial potential of
creating more interdisciplinary coordination among the institutes:
The study of the impact of radiation upon living organisms is a topic many
institutions are working on, but unfortunately, this work is still insufficiently
coordinated. There is overlap—there are cases in which when we do not take
advantage of our opportunities. For this reason we find it advisable to propose—
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for the coordination of work by departmental branches of our science, to create
commissions, which could chart the topics of the coming year, without any order
or decree, but rather by agreement reached by each of the separate institutions.422
In this way, Pobedinskiy encouraged more unified and comprehensive research in the
sense that by increasing communication between the individual research institutes, they
could not only avoid duplicating tasks that did not need duplication, and at the same time,
participate in complex, interdisciplinary research endeavors.
It is worth acknowledging the role of non-human animals in the course of
scientific research carried out in pursuit of knowledge on radiation and the hazards and
opportunities it offered in the nexus of national security-medicine-economic
development. As has long been a common practice in scientific communities across the
world, animals were used commonly for this research. Any projects involving humans are
simply not available in unclassified material. In numerous cases, research projects stalled
or had to be revised altogether as a result of problems arising from unexpected
occurrences that rendered a particular group or species of animal unsuitable for a given
experiment. Throughout the archives of the IEM, one can find the common complaint
regarding the “poor quality” of mice and other animals causing delays throughout
experimental phases of research. One project investigating the influence of fever on the
excretion of radioisotopes had involved a method of testing and comparing outcomes of
exposure to radioisotopes in rats with and without fever. However, the project stalled due
to the technicians’ inability to induce fever in any of the laboratory rats. The presenters

422

Statement by M. N. Pobedinskiy, quoted from minutes of meeting, 27 April 1954. TsGANTD SPb,
Fond R-182, Opis’ 14, Delo 30, p. 53.

147

noted that “there remains work to be carried out with rabbits, although this rather
complicates the biochemical aspect.”423 To this, Professor Pobedinskiy responded,
“Rabbits as experimental subjects for research with radioactive substances are ill-suited,
as they are more susceptible to shock. It is more advisable to carry out this experiment on
cats or dogs.”424
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CHAPTER VI: THE GLOBAL COMMODIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WASTELAND
IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA
Initial expansion to SNF reprocessing technology beginning in mid-1970s
Whether serving civilian or military purposes, the production of nuclear materials
necessarily involves fuel assemblies of uranium and plutonium arranged in varying
concentrations for the purpose of generating reactions that result in energy release.425
This fuel assembly serves as the core of the nuclear fuel cycle, both for weapons
production and nuclear energy reactors.426 After a certain amount of time in energy
production use, the materials used in fuel assemblies decrease in capacity to generate
nuclear reactions, even while they are still significantly radioactive and require special
management to ensure radiation safety.427 At this point, these fuel assemblies contain
what is termed spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which can be reprocessed into productive fuel
again, as well as various kinds of radioactive wastes.428 The concept of reprocessing
SNF is often termed “closing the nuclear cycle” to emphasize the continuous reuse of
materials and the reduction of waste.429 The extent to which a given amount of fuel can
be repeatedly reprocessed while minimizing loss or waste of materials depends on the
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nuclear reactor type in which it is being reprocessed and the reactor’s technological
capacity and speed.430

Background of SNF reprocessing operations at PO Mayak
At PO Mayak, the reprocessing of SNF as part of the weapons production process had
formed an integral component of the facility since its beginning, carried out by the
radiochemical plant (RT-1) within the PO Mayak complex.431 In the early 1970s, the
Soviet Union began expanding its industrial operations in reprocessing SNF.432 As
Egorov et al. note, in 1971, PO Mayak began reprocessing SNF from other nuclear
reactors throughout the Soviet Union as well as from nuclear-powered naval vessels.433
The significance of PO Mayak’s expansion into “closed nuclear fuel cycle” is that it
enabled the facility opportunities to broaden its economic and industrial viability during
the time when the Soviet Union had begun to seek a path towards nuclear
disarmament.434 One of two main reasons for this development included the broader
effort to act in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 (UN Office for Disarmament
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Affairs).435 In particular, as concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons
across the world loomed on the geopolitical stage, the Soviet Union’s large fleet of
nuclear-powered submarines stood as potential security risks given the ease with which
the vessels’ fuel assemblies could fall into the possession of unauthorized actors.436 At
the same time, by expanding its role into civilian realms of nuclear production, PO
Mayak further established its economic and industrial viability in spite of the steady
decrease in demand for weapons-grade plutonium.437
The second main reason for expanding SNF reprocessing operations lay in the
need for securing adequate supplies of uranium at a time when existing global uranium
ore reserves were unknown, in addition to uncertainty regarding the ability to access
them.438 Therefore, SNF reprocessing ensured a quantifiable supply of uranium to
sustain and continue developing civilian nuclear energy production in the Soviet
Union.439

Stockpiles of plutonium at PO Mayak for future use
The international call to scale down nuclear weapons production in accordance with the
1968 NPT along with the growing need to diversify the economic and industrial
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relevance of nuclear production facilities in the Soviet Union gave rise not only to the
expansion of SNF reprocessing, but also to the development of specialized storage
facilities in which to dispose of what was considered “excess” quantities of weaponsgrade Plutonium-239.440 Excess quantities of plutonium became defined as such in
accordance with the NPT.441 The question of how to securely handle excess plutonium
required an especially large-scale and complex response given that the Soviet Union
was believed to hold the largest inventory of plutonium in the world.442
One of the directions PO Mayak pursued in responding to the need to safely
handle plutonium that would not be used for weapons production was to simply
stockpile it for future use.443 This approach was based on the anticipation of future
developments in nuclear technology that would enable weapons-grade plutonium to be
blended with uranium to produce mixed oxide fuel (MOX).444 Specifically, the
development in nuclear technology anticipated by the Soviet ministry of atomic energy,
Minatom, was the design and construction of fast-neutron reactors (FNR) which could
use MOX fuel to generate nuclear energy.445 In this way, such a lucrative, civilian

440

Wolfsthal et al., Nuclear Status Report.

441

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” UNODA.

442

Ibid.

443

Ibid.

444

Mironova et al., “The most contaminated place on Earth.”

445

Ibid.

152

purpose for weapons-grade plutonium rendered the possibility of producing MOX fuel
as especially attractive incentive for stockpiling plutonium.446
While the stockpiling of plutonium as well as radioactive wastes is commonly
practiced in the United States, Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, and other
countries possessing commercial nuclear reactors to produce energy, two aspects set
Russia apart.447 The first aspect is that PO Mayak, as at other plutonium production
sites in Russia, the amount of plutonium is not only greater than anywhere else in the
world, but the exact amount in its inventories has never been disclosed.448 The second
aspect is that given the track record of serious nuclear accidents in Russia, and
especially at PO Mayak, the safety and security risks inherent in such large stockpiles
of plutonium continue to raise concerns for local residents and the international
community.449

PO Mayak as an international “recycling” plant of spent nuclear fuel
The economic aspect which rendered the reprocessing of SNF a critical area of
economic growth for the Soviet nuclear industry during the 1970s became even more
crucial for Russia during the economic crisis which unfolded nationwide in the wake of
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.450 In this way, while PO Mayak had become the
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final destination of SNF from nuclear reactors including naval vessel reactors
throughout the Soviet Union as well as its satellite states before the dissolution in 1991,
after the dissolution the incoming traffic of SNF and radioactive wastes from other
countries such as Finland and Germany to be reprocessed at PO Mayak and sent back to
the countries of origin provided a vital source of revenue.451 Therefore, while the shortlived rise of Russia’s environmental movement in the early 1990s led to legislation that
prohibited the permanent storage of foreign SNF and radioactive waste on Russian
territory, the political changes that accompanied Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power in the
late 1990s almost immediately reversed the progress in PO Mayak’s transparency and
accountability for which local environmental and social organizations had so diligently
campaigned.452 Arguing for the economic prioritization of the nuclear industry, Putin
lifted the ban on permanent storage of foreign SNF and radioactive waste.453 Indeed, as
Natalia Mironova writes of her short-lived tenure as director of the environmental
oversight commission in the city of Chelyabinsk, the reactionary old guard of former
Communist Party members exploited the economic crisis and their enduring ties with
Moscow to regain traction in local power structures in the Southern Urals and
eventually undo much of the progress for which Mironova and many other activists had
campaigned since the late 1980s.454 Within these entrenched local power structures, PO
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Mayak had held an especially privileged position, as a “state within a state,”
transcending governance and law since its creation in 1948.455 As long as this
exceptionally privileged state-within-a-state was left intact, along with the same key
officials who maintained it, the transition from Soviet socialism to a market-driven
society did not give way to meaningful democratic change in the Southern Urals.456 In
this way, PO Mayak assumed a lucrative position as a key player in the increasingly
important global realms of SNF and radioactive waste handling and disposal, while
public health and environmental concerns became relegated as secondary to the
prioritized concern of economic development both locally and nationally.
PO Mayak’s ascent in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union is
significant for two reasons. First, it allowed PO Mayak to position itself as an
indispensable actor in the ongoing geopolitical and diplomatic contexts of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. In terms of complying with the NPT, nuclear
warheads and other military equipment is routed to PO Mayak’s reprocessing facility
where they are dismantled.457 Relatedly, weapons-grade plutonium is removed and
stored.458 Additionally, PO Mayak is one of the primary destinations upon which the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focuses in order to verify Russian
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compliance with the NPT.459 Second, PO Mayak’s ascent has defined the Southern
Urals as a key hub in the traffic of radioactive materials from across the globe.460 As
citizens of countries with significant stores of SNF and radioactive waste express ever
greater unease and opposition to the storage of such hazardous wastes in their
communities, many of these countries, such as Germany, Belgium, Norway, Finland,
Romania, and others have been willing to pay high costs to export these materials to
Russia.461 Given PO Mayak’s highly skilled workforce, along with its existing
infrastructure to handle a wide range of SNF and radioactive wastes, the Russian
government and nuclear industry set their sights on exploiting what they viewed, and
presently continue to view, as an especially competitive advantage in the global market
for SNF reprocessing and nuclear waste disposal.462

Role of the United States in further expansion of PO Mayak SNF reprocessing
facilities and activity
In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the so-called
“new world order” famously heralded by President George H. W. Bush ushered in a
period of closer, if cautious, collaboration between the nuclear-industrial establishments
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of the United States and the Russian Federation. The United States’ official position
regarding the nature of diplomatic relations between the two countries following the
dissolution provided three main reasons for pursuing close collaborative relations
between the American and Russian nuclear-industrial establishments, as headed by
their respective federal agencies - Department of Energy (DOE) in the U.S. and
Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) in Russia. The first main reason arose in relation
to the existing Cooperative Threat Reduction (CRT) program, also known as the NunnLugar Program, which was created for the purpose of neutralizing the Soviet Union’s
arsenal of not only nuclear, but all weapons and infrastructure with the potential of
mass destruction. In a broader sense, this program supported the principle of nonproliferation which had become a fundamental tenet of global security and diplomatic
policy.463 The second main reason the DOE pursued close partnerships with Minatom
after 1991 centers on the growing concern regarding the security of weapons-grade
materials and technology, specifically in terms of their accessibility to unauthorized
users who may potentially deploy such materials for the purpose of executing terrorist
plots. Third, in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, along with the
world’s broadening awareness of the long history of radioactive contamination events
having taken place in the Soviet Union, the concern for health and environmental
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safety, not only in the former Soviet Union, but across the globe, necessarily took on an
urgent register.464
In addition to the official objectives for which the United States pursued an
apparently more amicable and closer collaborative relationship with Russia’s nuclearindustrial establishment, this new atmosphere of warmer collaborative relations along
with Russia’s weakened leverage and negotiating power in the midst of its growing
economic crisis presented especially lucrative opportunities for private American
entrepreneurs and corporations.465 This resulted from numerous contracts made
available to private bidders by the DOE as well as Department of Defense (DOD) as
part of a range of construction projects and training programs negotiated between the
two countries in order to help Russia safely dispose of or more effectively secure its
inventory of nuclear weapons-grade material and to provide necessary upgrades to
radiation safety infrastructure as well as training for the workforce at nuclear energy
plants as well as specialized hubs of nuclear production facilities such as PO Mayak.
Among the corporations whose bids won contracts to upgrade reprocessing and storage
facilities at PO Mayak as well as construct new facilities, Bechtel Corporation stands
out as one with a leading role. As archived records from correspondence between
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (DOE) and demonstrate, Bechtel was awarded a
contract to upgrade and expand PO Mayak’s main reprocessing facility in 1993.
However, Bechtel’s record of engineering and construction projects, including cleanup
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and upgrades at Washington’s Hanford shows indications of failing to meet established
safety standards which raises questions about the quality of Bechtel’s projects at a site
where the stakes for health and environmental safety are particularly high.466
Apart from the rise of ethical questions regarding the equity of collaborative
relationships between the United States and Russia in the midst of private enterprises’
potential exploitation of Russia’s massive health, environmental, and economic crises
for profit, Russian officials raised their own concerns about the equity of the
partnerships being formed between the two nations. A collection of correspondence
held in NRC Commissioner De Planque’s archived records includes mentions of NRC
and DOE officials’ reflections and considerations regarding their Russian partners’
questions and concerns regarding intellectual rights over the data they possess relating
to the medical histories of radiation exposure victims as well as ecological research
carried out in contaminated areas. Furthermore, in more recent history, Russian nuclear
industry officials have made reference to the disappointment of what they perceive as
broken promises for financial assistance from the United States over the past few
decades regarding technological development of radioactive waste disposal and SNF
reprocessing construction on Russian territory and on Russian terms. For example, in
October 2016, the Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov announced technological
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advancements in Russia that have now enabled a new method of plutonium disposal.467
This new method, as described by Ryabkov, involves incineration within a nuclear
reactor, not only represents a departure from the method commonly used in American
facilities, but also is reported to be pose less ecological threat while costing less
money.468 A key point in Ryabkov’s announcement made note of the departure from a
partnership agreement with the United States, partly due to what Russia perceived as
the United States’ failure to fulfill their end of the partnership agreement in assisting
Russia with the disposal of excess weapons-grade plutonium.469 As Ryabkov pointed
out: “...the experience of implementing this agreement has showed that the Americans
from the very beginning didn’t behave like partners as regards their promises to give us
financial assistance. It was clear by the mid-2000s that there would be no real support
in this sphere.”470
These examples of the role of the United States in establishing agreements and
collaborating with Russia to secure and upgrade its nuclear facilities and ensure
compliance with the principles of nuclear non-proliferation demonstrate that United
States has played, and continues to play a key role in the outcome of developments of
Russia’s nuclear-industrial developments, at times in ways that differ from the original
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intent of U. S. involvement, as the cases of Bechtel and the faltering partnership cited
by Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov.

NASA contract to purchase plutonium from PO Mayak in early 1990s
In a special agreement not related to partnership agreements on radioactive waste
disposal or SNF reprocessing facilities, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) of the U.S. and PO Mayak negotiated terms by which NASA
would purchase non-weapons-grade Plutonium -238 for use in specialized battery packs
designed to power spacecraft intended for long exploratory cosmic journeys which
could potentially last a few decades without having the opportunity to refuel or
recharge. The archives of the organization Greenpeace include documents announcing
this agreement as well as the concerns of environmental advocates about the ethical and
environmental implications of a U.S. government agency entering into a purchasing
agreement with PO Mayak without establishing more stringent requirements to protect
local landscapes and communities from potential impacts of perpetuating plutonium
production.
One of the goals of Greenpeace activists at that point in 1992 was to petition
and pressure NASA to use the potential deal with PO Mayak as leverage with which to
require more concrete progress in improving local environmental conditions and
funding greater support for local communities, especially those most seriously impacted
by the health hazards and economic losses resulting from decades of radioactive
contamination. However, the deal proceeded as planned and continued until 2009 when
Russia announced it would not continue selling plutonium to NASA for the foreseeable
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future. Not long following this announcement, engineers in the United States
announced the automation of plutonium production which will ensure a stable supply of
Pu-238 for NASA.

Relationship between civil society and PO Mayak in the face of new risks in
radioactive contamination
In spite of the economic crisis following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the period
following 1991 ushered in the unprecedented growth of civil society groups vocalizing
their concerns as citizens and demanding responsive action by government bodies.471 In
particular, the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
tumultuous period that followed it gave rise to increasing environmental concerns
vocalized by such civil society groups.472 In some ways, the years of perestroika in the
late 1980s, marked by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident necessarily shaped the
character of post-Soviet civil society.473 In continuation of the call for democracy and
greater accountability to the citizenry, Boris Yeltsin vocalized agreement with socialenvironmental activists in the Techa River Valley who called for the recognition of
their rights as victims of radiation exposure as well as the right to receive government
compensation.474
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Discursive production of “radiophobia” as a disinformation tool
As perestroika dovetailed with the massive outrage throughout the Soviet Union and
the public’s demands for transparency following the tragedy of Chernobyl in 1986,
many citizens in the Southern Urals began to learn of the real reasons behind forced
relocations they had been subjected to, mysterious illnesses that had afflicted neighbors,
co-workers, and family members. After decades of enduring radioactive contamination
completely unaware of it, many of these citizens turned the outrage and grief over the
years of pain and loss caused by PO Mayak’s practices into organized opposition
against PO Mayak and civic engagement in their communities.475 Such community
organizing and civic engagement resulted in tangible progress exemplified by the
declassification of years of records relating to PO Mayak’s policies and practices, as
well as federal legislation such as the prohibition of permanent storage of foreign SNF
and radioactive waste on Russian territory.476
However, Russia’s nuclear industry, along with conservative and reactionary
politicians began to construct a public relations narrative which increasingly, during the
late 1990s, involved elaborate smear campaigns against progressive politicians who
raised concerns about health and ecological impacts of nuclear production as well as
social and environmental activists.477 In the Southern Urals region specifically, PO
Mayak officials with access to local mass media ran propaganda campaigns aimed at
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discrediting the organizations and individuals who were leading the calls for
transparency and accountability regarding the history of radioactive contamination to
which local communities were subjected by PO Mayak.478 Such campaigns not only
sought to discredit social and environmental activists by accusing them of being funded
by foreign groups seeking to undermine Russia’s economic interests, but they also
deployed the term, “radiophobia” as a cognitive flaw among poorly educated and
misinformed individuals whose concerns regarding radiation exposure and
contamination are rooted not in reality but in ignorance regarding the nuclear
science.479 As medical anthropologist Magdalena Stawkowski writes on the
construction of radiophobia across a variety of radiated landscapes, particularly in the
former Soviet Union, it is used in all of these settings as a tool with which to minimize
and even mythologize “decades of violent histories and toxic legacies.”480 In this way,
such public relations campaigns, powered by funding from both the Russian state and
Minatom (the Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia) effectively decreased public
support for the local environmental oversight commission, Movement for Nuclear
Safety, and eroded individuals’ trust in their own abilities to distinguish hazard from
safety.481
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Whistleblowers and activists portrayed as threats to national security
In addition to becoming victims of smear campaigns, social and environmental activists
in the Southern Urals as well as Russia, have been portrayed not only by the nuclear
industry but the Russian state as threats to Russia’s national security. Among the most
well-known of these cases involves a former Russian Navy officer, Andrei Nikitin, who
became a vocal environmental activist with the organization, Bellona Foundation,
calling for attention to the severe risks of radioactive contamination posed by the large
number of idle nuclear-powered submarines in the Russian North. Nikitin was arrested
on charges of treason and espionage, and he endured four years of wrongful
imprisonment until he finally won his case for acquittal of these charges.482 In other
cases, such as that of Thomas Nilsen, a journalist who has spent many years
investigating sources of radioactive contamination impacting the Arctic region, Russian
nuclear industry officials with international clout acted to persuade Nilsen’s employer,
The Barents Observer, to temporarily dismiss him for what had been described as
defamation of Russia’s nuclear industry.483
Within the past few years, among the most severe examples of the threat faced
by whistleblowers and activists is reflected in the experiences of the sociologist,
lawyer, and activist, Nadezhda Kutepova, who was born and raised in the restricted city
of Ozyorsk, formerly Chelyabinsk-40. As a lawyer and activist, she devoted years
towards helping victims of radiation exposure bring forth their legal claims for
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compensation and become aware of their own rights as citizens.484 However, as a result
of Kutepova’s persistent efforts to struggle for justice for these otherwise invisible
communities, and her vocal opposition to the lack of transparency and accountability of
PO Mayak and the Russian nuclear industry, Kutepova became a target of both local
and federal authorities.485 In this way, Kutepova faced repeated accusations of tax
evasion, and ultimately, like Andrei Nikitin, she was accused of espionage and
treason.486 For this reason, in 2015, Kutepova and her four children fled Russia, as she
was granted political asylum in France where she has tried to continue the work of
raising awareness about unjust social and environmental conditions in the Southern
Urals.487
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CONCLUSION
My goals in pursuing this research on the social-environmental inequalities in the
Southern Urals, specifically along the Techa River Valley, as a question of environmental
injustice, included not only to contribute to academic literature on the history of socialenvironmental conflict in the Soviet Union, but to pursue questions for which there are no
clear answers. What does history show regarding the appropriation of land in the
Southern Urals before the construction of PO Mayak had even been planned? What did
the Soviet production of space demonstrate about the possibility for equitable social
relations in the Southern Urals? How did the Soviet state--established on principles of
creating an emancipated, classless society, on dismantling inequality, racism/xenophobia,
facism--justify and allow rural communities, largely of Bashkir and Tatar ethnic
backgrounds, to bear the brunt of repeated accidental radioactive contamination, all while
withholding vital information about the contamination itself as well as individuals’ own
medical records?
How did the United States justify withholding information about PO Mayak’s
1957 "Kyshtym disaster" from the world, initially denying what the Central Intelligence
Agency knew even after the geneticist Zhores Medvedev published his own findings to
demonstrate when and where the radioactive explosion occurred, knowing that thousands
of civilian human beings had been exposed to lethal levels of radiation exposure as a
result of it? If socialism itself is to blame as the source of "ecocide" as many Western
observers have portrayed the Soviet brand of environmental degradation, how is it that
rural communities of the Techa River have continued to be exposed to radiation leaks,
albeit not as extreme as the events from the first decade of PO Mayak’s operation, almost
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three decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union? While some victims do receive
some form of government compensation for radiation exposure, why are many other
victims of radiation illness in the Techa River Valley still met with denials and
stonewalling when they rightfully ask for their own compensation from the government?
These are all questions which fall within the scope of environmental justice.
Today, residents of the Techa River Valley often express the lament that they feel
forgotten. As Kate Brown has noted, Chernobyl became a household word, and the
victims of that disaster have had opportunities to tell their stories in print and onscreen to
audiences worldwide. When I have casually mentioned my research topic even to
scholars of environmental studies, unless they already specialize in Russian
environmental studies, they always respond that they had never heard of Chelyabinsk or
PO Mayak. Therefore, despite the questions my research has left unanswered, by
continuing to ask these questions, my hope is that it contributes to the antidote against
toxic amnesia, and inspire others to continue asking these questions and demanding
answers.

168

APPENDIX I: LETTER FROM MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO INSTITUTE OF
EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE RECOMMENDING RESEARCH TOPICS ON
RADIATION ILLNESS
Ministry of Health USSR488
14 October 1955
№ 6358с
To the Director of the Institute of Experimental Medicine, AMN, Professor Biryukov, D.
A.:
I am sending recommendations for the construction of the scientific research plan for
1956-1957 regarding radiation illness and combined impacts on organisms.
With these recommendations in mind, I ask that you plan research projects on this
problem for 1956-1957, and that you incorporate this into the work plan for your
institute, and I ask that you to present this plan by 10 November 1955 to the Department
of Medical Radiology of the Ministry of Health on the specified recommendations while
taking into account the work that has been completed on this topic at your institute in
1955.

Head of the Department of Medical Radiology: E. Vorovyov.

Recommendations for construction of the scientific research plan on the problem of
radiation illness and combined impacts on organisms, 1956-1957.

The complex of problems relating to injuries and illness associated with atomic weapons
in our time takes on special, important significance. Primary attention in addressing this
problem should be oriented towards scientific research and practice, taking into account
its relevance to defense and its critical importance to life itself. Listed below are
exemplary topics for scientific research to be developed in 1956 to 1957.
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My English translation of the letter from E. I. Vorovyov, Chief of Dept. of Medical Radiology of the
Ministry of Health, USSR, to D. A. Biryukov, Director of the Institute of Experimental Medicine of the
Academy of Medical Sciences, USSR.
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I.
1. Development of shock under conditions of the first period of radiation illness.
Measures to prevent it, first aid, and follow-up treatment.
2. Shock during the later stages of radiation illness. Prophylaxis and treatment for it.
II.
3. The duration and treatment of internal cranial injuries during radiation illness (bruises,
concussion, contusions).
4. External cranial injuries under conditions of radiation illness. Special considerations
regarding duration and treatment.

5. Trauma to the face and jaw during an atomic attack. Special considerations regarding
the sequence of manifest injuries, and treatment under conditions of radiation illness.
III.
6. Internal injury of organs within the chest cavity. Special considerations of treatment
during radiation illness.
7. Penetrating wounds of organs in the chest cavity. Duration and treatment under
conditions of radiation illness.
8. Internal injury of organs within the abdominal cavity and their duration under
conditions of radiation illness.
9. External injuries affecting organs within the abdominal cavity and their treatment
under conditions of radiation illness.
10. Weakness and tremors affecting the organs of the body. Special considerations of
their duration and treatment under conditions of radiation illness.
IV.
11. Internal bone fractures and their treatment during radiation illness.
12. External bone fractures and their treatment during radiation illness.
13. Development of osteomyelitis [bone infection] under conditions of radiation illness.
14. Methods of speeding up bone tissue regeneration after fractures in the context of
injuries resulting from ionizing radiation.
15. Immobilization of transportation and the combination of impacts under the conditions
of an atomic attack.
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16. Infectious fractures and their duration under conditions of radiation illness.
17. Combinations of antibiotics to be administered under conditions of trauma and
radiation illness.
18. The effect of vitamin B6 and B12 upon the regeneration of bone tissue during
radiation illness.
19. Injury of peripheral nerves. Duration, regeneration, treatment to preserve neural tissue
and surgery under conditions of radiation illness (initial and delayed sutures).
V.
20. Special considerations of the duration and treatment of wounds on various parts of the
body under conditions of radiation illness.
21. Microbial flora of wounds during radiation illness.
22. Duration of anaerobic infections under conditions of radiation illness (tetanus, gas
gangrene).
23. Effect of denervation during the inflammatory process and regeneration of tissue
during radiation illness.
24. First treatment of wounds during radiation illness.
25. First treatment of complex wounds.
26. Delayed treatment of wounds under conditions of radiation illness.
27. Follow-up suturing of wounds under conditions of a combination of injuries.
28. Antibiotics during the treatment of wounds and radiation illness.
VI.
29. Burns and radiation illness. Special considerations of their duration and treatment.
30. Blood and plasma transfusion for burns under conditions of radiation illness.
31. Transfusion of blood replacement fluids for burns under conditions of radiation
illness.
32. Special considerations regarding the duration and treatment of burns in cases of a
combination of injuries and radiation illness.
33. Administering vitamin B12 for burns during radiation illness.
34. Effectiveness of necrolytic agents for the treatment of third degree burns (trypsin,
pepsin, streptokinase, streptodornase, etc.) including for the treatment of burns
associated with ionizing radiation.
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35. New methods of accelerating the treatment of deep burns.
36. Grafts of preserved tissue for homoplastic replacement of skin injuries and other
tissues.
VII.
37. Administering vitamin B12 for a combination of injuries and radiation illness.
38. Parenteral application of protein treatments and protein hydrolysate formulas for a
combination of injuries, burns, and radiation illness.
39. Transfusion of blood and blood replacements for a combination of injuries and
radiation illness.
40. New blood replacement fluids for the treatment of radiation illness and a combination
of injuries.
VIII.
41. Principles of first aid, triage, and evacuation during an atomic attack.
42. Medical assistance during the evacuation stage during an atomic attack.

In terms of the planned research topics regarding radiation illness in combination with
injuries, external and internal radiation under conditions of radioactive substances
entering an organism and causing radiation illness should accordingly be kept in mind.
The development of treatments and prophylactic measures for wounds and burns on the
body contaminated with radioactive substances is also of extreme importance.

Annotation format for the plan:

1. Name of institution
2. Title of problem and topic
3. Scientific lead and laboratory executer for the project (academic level, title, last name,
initials)
4. Short summary of work on the topic, answering the following questions:
a) research objective
b) To what extent has work on this topic been completed so far (for those which have
already begun in 1955, briefly specify the results obtained so far)
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c) Methodology
d) Research site
5. Timeline for the research project

Head of Department of Medical Radiology, Ministry of Health, USSR, Vorovyov
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LIST OF ARCHIVES AND COLLECTIONS
Russian Federation
ARAN, Archives of the Russian Academy of Science (Arkhiv Rossiiskoi akademii nauk),
Moscow. Fond 1729: Collection of archival material corresponding to Mstislav
Vsevolodovich Keldysh (1911-1978), mathematician who specialized in
mechanics and aerohydrodynamics, served as Vice President of the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR 1960-1961, and as President, 1961-1975.
CGANTD SPb [alternatively, TsGANTD SPb], Central State Archives of ScientificTechnical Documentation of St. Petersburg (Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv
nauchno-tekhnicheskoi dokumentatsii Sankt-Peterburga). Fond R-182: Collection
of archival material corresponding to the Institute of Experimental Medicine.
OGAChO, Joint State Archives of Chelyabinsk Oblast (Ob”edinennyi gosudarstvennyi
arkhiv Cheliabinskoi oblasti), Chelyabinsk. Fond R-76: Collection of personal
archives corresponding to the economic geographer, Fyodor Yakovlevich Kirin;
Fond R-274: Collection of archival material corresponding to the Council of the
People’s Deputies of Chelyabinsk Oblast and their executive committees (19341993).
United States
E. Gail De Planque Papers (EGDP), Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford
University, Palo Alto, CA.
Victor Galinsky Papers, Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford University,
Palo Alto, CA.
Pavel Oleinikov Papers, Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford University,
Palo Alto, CA.
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